Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Gwendolyn Barnett appealed orders granting relief to Robert Lee Hull, Jr. Barnett and Hull are siblings and the sole legal heirs of their father, Robert Lee Hull, Sr. ("Robert"), who died testate. Pursuant to Robert's will, Hull and Barnett were listed as beneficiaries entitled to equal shares of his estate and Barnett was named personal representative of his estate. Hull filed a complaint against Barnett, arguing that in her role as "a partial caretaker of [Robert]" before his death, had exerted undue influence over Robert and had gained control of Robert's personal property and assets. According to Hull, in the absence of Barnett's purported misconduct, items that Barnett allegedly misappropriated would "have become part of [Robert's] estate." Barnett moved ti dismiss her brother's tort action, claiming that Hull's complaint in the tort action realleged claims purportedly "identical" to claims that Hull had previously asserted in the estate administration, which had been dismissed. The trial court granted Hull's motion in full and denied Barnett's motion to dismiss. On appeal, among other things, Barnett contended the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hull's claims in the tort action, which she described as "central to the administration of the estate," while the estate administration remained separately pending. In her filings to the Supreme Court, Barnett characterized Hull's claims as "seek[ing] to identify property which he alleges should have been considered property of the Estate ... in the [first-filed] estate administration." To this, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over matters relating to the pending estate administration, and lacked jurisdiction to enter the the injunctive order or the subsequent show-cause order compelling Barnett's compliance with the injunctive order. The Supreme Court thus reversed all orders entered by the trial court in the tort action and remanded the matter for that court to enter an order dismissing Hull's complaint. View "Barnett v. Hull" on Justia Law

Appellant in his capacity as Litigation Trustee for the Erickson Litigation Trust, appeals the dismissal of his avoidance and recovery claims under the bankruptcy laws. In broad terms, these claims seek avoidance of settlement releases approved in Delaware state court, as well as two payments related to Erickson Air-Crane, Inc.’s acquisition of Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. (EHI) (the “Evergreen Transaction”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims relating to the settlement releases and reversed in part the dismissal of the payments relating to the Evergreen Transaction itself. The court concluded that consistent with Besing and Erlewine, there was reasonable equivalence as a matter of law. The Delaware settlement “should not be unwound by the federal courts merely because of its unequal division of [settlement proceeds].” Further, the court wrote that Appellant’s attempt to attack the Delaware releases as actually fraudulent transfers also fails. The court wrote it saw no error in the lower court's conclusion that Appellant failed to adequately plead actual fraud, and his arguments on appeal do not convince the court otherwise. Moreover, the court found that acting in his specific capacity, Appellant is not enjoined by the Delaware settlement from asserting creditor claims that arose only under the Bankruptcy Code. View "Ogle v. Morgan, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the district court's order in this will contest, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees and expenses.The jury in this case found that the will at issue was invalid as the product of undue influence. The proponent of the will appealed, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. The opponent of the will cross-appealed, challenging an award of attorney fees and expenses purportedly awarded under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2481 and 30-2482. The Supreme Court vacated the attorney fees and expenses portion of the order and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the jury's undue influence finding was not unreasonable; (2) there was no error related to opposing counsel's reference to the admission of a challenged text message; and (3) the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the award of attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending the will contest proceeding. View "In re Estate of Koetter" on Justia Law

Charles Edward Rainwater, Jean Rainwater Loggins, The Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, and the Rainwater Marital Trust appealed a circuit court's final judgment enforcing a settlement agreement in the litigation involving four siblings and the family trusts. They challenged three aspects of the judgment: its enforcement of the settlement agreement, its denial of a motion to dissolve a prior order enforcing the settlement agreement, and its denial of a motion to quash a garnishment. Because the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on enforcement of the settlement agreement, because the prior enforcement order was improper, and because any award on which the garnishment could have been based was being reversed, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to all three aspects. View "The Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, et al. v. Rainwater" on Justia Law

Christopher Luck, as legal guardian and conservator for Ethel Luck, appealed a district court’s dismissal of Ethel’s negligence claim against Sarah Rohel for injuries Ethel sustained in a car accident. On March 13, 2019, the last day before the applicable statute of limitations ran, Amy Clemmons, Ethel’s daughter, signed and filed a pro se Complaint against Rohel on Ethel’s behalf, alleging a single count of negligence. Ethel did not sign the Complaint. The same day, Ethel signed a durable power of attorney designating Clemmons as her attorney-in-fact. Clemmons was a licensed Washington attorney, who, at the time the Complaint was filed, was not licensed to practice law in Idaho. A little over a month later, Clemmons filed a pro se Amended Complaint, which continued to identify the same plaintiff, “AMY CLEMMONS, as Guardian for ETHEL LUCK.” Both Ethel and Clemmons signed the Amended Complaint. Rohel moved to strike the first complaint, arguing Clemmons, who was not licensed to practice law in Idaho, signed the Complaint. Rohel also moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing Clemmons had not been appointed as Ethel’s guardian, was not admitted to the Idaho State Bar and therefore, lacked authority to file the Complaint on Ethel’s behalf. Clemmons subsequently retained an attorney, who filed a notice of appearance on April 23, 2019. The notice of appearance failed to specify whether counsel appeared on behalf of Clemmons, Ethel or both. Counsel argued that Idaho law allowed Clemmons to act as a general guardian and as such, Clemmons was the real party in interest and could initiate a lawsuit pro se, on behalf of Ethel. Additionally, counsel argued that any deficiencies in the Complaint had been cured pursuant to Rule 11 because Ethel signed the Amended Complaint. The district court granted both of Rohel's motions, and Clemmons appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment, finding it erred in applying the rule of nullity to strike Clemmons' Complaint. The Supreme Court determined the caselaw the trial court used as grounds for its judgment was no longer applicable in light of subsequent amendments to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In light of this holding, the Supreme Court remanded this matter to allow the district court to exercise its discretion and determine whether to allow Plaintiff Luck to cure the improper signature. View "Luck v. Rohel" on Justia Law

Respondent Neumiller & Beardslee filed a renewal request for a 2008 judgment and identified Estate Administrator Audrey Douglas as the judgment debtor without stating she was named in her role as the administrator of an estate as set forth in the original judgment. When it discovered this, respondent filed a motion to correct the error. The trial court granted that motion and corrected the judgment nunc pro tunc. Appellant Joanna Douglas-Dorsey, who was a beneficiary of the estate argued on appeal the trial court erred in correcting that error because it was not a clerical error. Remembering the “law respects form less than substance” the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Estate of Douglas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in this action brought by the personal representative of the Estate of Susan Markve against Kenneth Markve (Ken) alleging undue influence, conversion, statutory fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and common law fraud, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained.The Estate brought this action alleging that Susan lacked capacity to execute a quitclaim deed to a certain house and the power of attorney naming Ken as her agent. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Ken, concluding that no factual basis supported the Estate's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that questions of fact should have precluded summary judgment on several of the Estate's claims. View "Johnson v. Markve" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the underlying circuit court action filed by three sisters (Sisters), holding that the circuit court correctly denied the writ.The Sisters, daughters of Elbert Goff Sr., brought the underlying complaint against, among others, Appellant, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Elbert's Estate, alleging that Appellant breached her fiduciary duties to Elbert before he died through self-dealing. The circuit court denied Appellant's ensuing motion to dismiss. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the Sisters' complaint, but the court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case; and (2) an appellate remedy was available, and great injustice and irreparable injury will not be suffered by Appellant. View "Goff v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals for failing as a reviewing court to give proper deference to the trial court's decision to deny Appellees leave to amend a pleading and held that the court erred when it found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to probate the will at issue in this action.Plaintiff filed this action challenging the validity of the decedent's will and asserting claims of undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants and requesting a declaration that the will was invalid. After Plaintiff settled his claims with some of the defendants, defendant Suzanne McGaha filed a motion for leave to amend her answer and to assert cross-claims and certain objections. The district court overruled the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the probate matter because of an alleged defect with verification of the probate petition; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Suzanne's motion for leave to amend her answer to assert cross-claims. View "McGaha v. McGaha" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery held that the petition in this case alleging that Respondent, a former teacher, befriended and manipulated a woman, now deceased, through coercion into receiving millions of dollars of the woman's inheritances should be dismissed in full, with prejudice.Petitioner filed a verified petition to, among other things, invalidate will and trust agreements, for breach of a fiduciary duty, and demand for accounting. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding (1) most of Petitioner's claims were either expressly time barred or sought a collateral attack on the incontestable final wishes of the decedent and that there was no viable basis for tolling the applicable limitations; and (2) Petitioner did not have standing to assert her remaining claims. View "Rambo v. Fischer" on Justia Law