Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee. View "In re Trust of Burgauer" on Justia Law

This action was brought by plaintiff Nancy Holm, administratrix of the estate of her husband, Christopher Friedauer, who died in 2015 after falling at his workplace, Holmdel Nurseries, LLC. As a longtime employee of the family-owned business, Christopher had been covered by workers’ compensation insurance, but he was no longer covered after he became a member of the LLC in 2012. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Daniel Purdy, who served as the insurance broker for Holmdel Nurseries from 2002 to 2015, failed to provide to the LLC the notice mandated by N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, and that Christopher was unaware that he no longer had workers’ compensation coverage in his new role as an LLC member. She alleged that as a result of defendant’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Friedauer’s dependents were deprived of a workers’ compensation death benefit to which they would have been entitled under N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 had he been covered by workers’ compensation insurance at the time of his death. Defendant asserted that Friedauer’s father, Robert Friedauer, the LLC’s managing member for insurance issues, instructed defendant in 2002 that Holmdel Nurseries did not want to purchase workers’ compensation coverage for its LLC members because of the cost of that coverage. At the close of a jury trial, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) and his motion for judgment at trial pursuant to Rule 4:40-1. Informed by the New Jersey Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf was eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Supreme Court held that defendant could not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause. Accordingly, the Court concurred that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and his motion for judgment at trial, and affirmed as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. The case was thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Holm v. Purdy" on Justia Law

The decedent Willie Clyde Burns married Silver Ruth Cooper in 1959. The couple lived in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana and had three children. A divorce petition was filed in 1966 in Arkansas, captioned “Sybia Ruth Burns vs. W. C. Burns.” A final judgment of divorce was rendered on August 26, 1966 by the Arkansas court. Willie filed a divorce petition in Claiborne Parish in 1967, and the petition was served on Silver, captioned “W.C. Burns (Col.) vs. Sylvia Ruth Burns.” There was no judgment of final divorce rendered in this case. Silver went on to marry Welcome Boyd in 1968. Willie went on to marry Annie Bradley in 1970. Annie testified at trial that at the start of their marriage she and Willie had no assets and that anything Willie owned at the time of his death was acquired during their marriage. The couple was married for 45 years and had two children. Willie died intestate in 2015. Annie petitioned to open Willie’s succession and appoint an administratrix. Silver filed a Petition in Intervention in which she sought to be named Willie’s surviving spouse as she was never lawfully divorced from him. In support of her position, Silver provided a report by a forensic document examiner who concluded that the signatures on the documents of both divorce proceedings did not belong to Silver. She also testified that she never went by the names Sybia or Sylvia. The trial court granted the petition to intervene, declared the Arkansas divorce invalid, and recognized Silver as the legal wife of Willie at the time of his death. In addition, the trial court found that Annie was a good faith putative spouse based on Annie’s testimony that Willie told her he was divorced. The trial court then said that the estate would be divided according to the formula in Prince v. Hopson, 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956), allocating one-fourth of the community to the legal spouse, one-fourth to the putative spouse, and the decedent’s one half to his heirs. The Lousiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's division of the community, finding that as a good faith putative spouse, Annie had an undivided one-half interest in the community. Willie’s five children were to divide equally his undivided one-half interest in the community, subject to Annie’s usufruct. View "Succession of Willie Clyde Burns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on remand declaring that Lynn and Lisa Schock satisfied the conditions of Bonnie J. Pease's handwritten holographic will, holding that the circuit court did not err.After the Supreme Court held that the will in this case appointed the Schocks as the personal representatives and gave them Bonnie's entire estate subject to conditions, the circuit court, on remand, declared that the Schocks satisfied the will's conditions and approved the proposed final distribution of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the Schocks satisfied the conditions. View "In re Estate of Hubert" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court discharging Guardian Life Insurance Company of America from this interpleader action and awarding the death benefit in dispute to Robyn Caplis-Sevelitte (Robyn), holding that remand was required for a determination of who was entitled to the death benefit.In this action, Renee Sevelitte, the ex-wife of Joseph Sevelitte, the decedent, and Robyn, the decedent's widow, asserted competing claims to the death benefit of a life insurance policy owned by Joseph and administered by Guardian. Renee sued Guardian asserting four claims based on Guardian's failure to pay her the proceeds from the policy and cross claimed against Robyn. Guardian asserted a counterclaim for interpleader against Renee, Robyn, and Joseph's estate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in Guardian's and Robyn's favor and dismissed Renee's crossclaims against Robyn. The First Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Guardian with respect to the death benefit from the policy but vacated and remanded as to Robyn, holding that the district court erred. View "Sevelitte v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America" on Justia Law

Wade Chapman (“Wade”) and his six siblings (“Siblings”) were the children of Wilford (“Bill”) Chapman. Bill had a life insurance policy for $7,000,000 that named the Chapman Family Multiple Power Liquidity Trust (“Trust”) as its owner. Wade, along with Siblings, were named as the Trust’s beneficiaries. Wade was also named a trustee. After Bill passed away, Wade learned that he was listed as the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy and retained the entirety of the death benefit for himself. Siblings sued Wade for breach of fiduciary duty, among other causes of action, arguing that the policy was a Trust asset, and its proceeds should have been distributed equally among them. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Siblings. It also awarded prejudgment interest against Wade under Idaho Code section 28-22-104 and attorney fees under Idaho Code section 15-8-201, a provision of the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Siblings, affirmed in part and reversed in part the award of prejudgment interest, and reversed the grant of attorney fees to Siblings under TEDRA. View "Vouk v. Chapman" on Justia Law

In this case stemming from a lengthy and acrimonious family dispute over the property of Donelson Glassie, whose estate remained in probate in Rhode Island eleven years after his death, the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the federal district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims as barred by the probate exception to federal court jurisdiction, holding that the district court erred.Plaintiff, Donelson's daughter, brought this action against several family members, including the executor of Donelson's estate, alleging that Defendants were liable to her under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) laws, 18 U.S.C. 1962, because they formed an enterprise that engaged in a pattern of fraudulent interstate communications and that Defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to her as a minority member of an entity wholly owned by a company in which the estate held a fifty-eight percent interest, and other claims. The district court dismissed all claims. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding the probate exception applicable to this case. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

Milton Turner died on July 25, 2018. On September 20, 2018, Mildred Williamson petitioned for letters of administration of Turner's estate in the probate court. In her petition, Williamson asserted that Turner had died intestate and that Williamson was Turner's only surviving heir. In 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Turner's estate, entered into a contract agreeing to sell to Matthew Drinkard and Jefferson Dolbare ("the purchasers") real property belonging to the estate for $880,650. The real-estate sales contract specified that the closing of the sale was to occur on or before May 31, 2019. On February 7, 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity as personal representative of Turner's estate, executed a deed conveying other real property that was part of Turner's estate to Marcus Hester. On February 13, 2019, Callway Sargent, alleging to be an heir of Turner's, filed a claim of heirship in Turner's estate. Sargent also moved for injunctive relief in which he acknowledged the February 7, 2019, deed, but asserted that Williamson had agreed to sell and had conveyed real property belonging to Turner's estate without the approval of the probate court, and requested that the probate court enjoin "Williamson from engaging in any further administration of [Turner's] estate until so ordered by [the probate court]." Williamson petitioned to have the case removed fro probate to the circuit court. From February 28, 2019, to March 18, 2019, a number of individuals came forward, all claiming to be Turner's heirs. Williamson moved to have the circuit court approve the pending property sales. Williamson and the purchasers did not close on the sale of the property that was the subject of their real-estate sales contract by May 31, 2019, as required by the contract. Some of the purported heirs petitioned the circuit court to stay or vacate the order approving the purchasers contact until matters regarding the heirs was resolved. Drinkard and Dolbare filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings regarding the administration of Turner's estate, but the circuit court denied the motion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of the purchasers' motion to intervene in the administration of Turner's estate. View "Drinkard, et al. v. Perry, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court disqualifying Risie Howard as the attorney representing the estate of Mrs. George Howard in a case arising from Mrs. Howard's medical treatment, holding that the circuit court's ruling represented a manifest abuse of discretion.On appeal, Howard argued that the circuit court erroneously interpreted Rule 3.7 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct and misapplied the test promulgated in Weigel v. Farmers Insurance Co., 158 S.W.3d 147 (Ark. 2004), in granting Defendants' motion to disqualify her. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not faithfully apply Rule 3.7 and the precedent established by Weigel and its progeny in disqualifying Howard. View "Howard v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law

Cheryl Feickert appealed a district court’s judgment entered after a bench trial. Ashley Feickert was a minor when her father died intestate in 1988. Ashley inherited an undivided one-fourth interest in real property from her father. Her mother, Cheryl, became her conservator in 1990. Cheryl, as conservator, leased Ashley's interest in the land starting in April 1989, but failed to provide an accounting of the lease income until September 2020. In March 2021, Ashley filed suit against Cheryl alleging breach of fiduciary duties for failure to keep suitable records, self-dealing, and failure to distribute assets as Ashley's conservator. Cheryl filed an answer asserting the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, laches, contributory negligence, unclean hands, and unjust enrichment. The answer included a prayer for relief requesting the court to dismiss the action, award reasonable fees and costs, and any other such relief the court deemed just and proper. Cheryl's answer did not include facts supporting her claimed defenses, nor did it specifically include a counterclaim for unjust enrichment or a request for a damages offset. The matter was tried to a district court and judgment entered in Ashley's favor. On appeal, Cheryl argued the district court erred by failing to consider her unjust enrichment claim and by denying her an offset to the damages awarded to Ashley. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Feickert v. Feickert" on Justia Law