Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a $225,000 life insurance policy issued on the life of C.S. When C.S. died in 2018, his estate (“Estate”) made a claim for the policy proceeds. His former employer, Kansas City Chrome Shop (“KCCS”), together with KCCS’s president, Dora Clark-Wall, made a competing claim. After the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate, Clark-Wall brought equitable claims in her personal capacity. Following a bench trial, the district court found that Clark-Wall was entitled to an equitable portion of the proceeds totaling $55,253.28 and that the Estate was entitled to the remaining $169,746.72. KCCS and Clark-Wall appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Clark-Wall’s continued payments and renewal of the policy were essentially a gamble on C.S’s life—a benefit she hoped to reap if he died before she did. The law does not view such conduct favorably. The court, therefore, failed to see how the principles of fairness and justice demand that Clark-Wall is awarded accumulated interest on her payments. Accordingly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s equitable award to Clark-Wall. View "The Estate of Charles D. Smith v. Kansas City Chrome Shop, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Sally Johnson's request to supervise and reform a trust and denied Mindy Smith's petition seeking clarification from the court and requesting other relief, holding that the circuit court erred in denying certain attorney fees.After Fred Peterson died, his daughter Sally filed separate petitions seeking court supervision and reformation of one of the two trusts he created in his lifetime. Another daughter, Mindy opposed the reformation and requested other relief. After a trial, the circuit court granted Sally's petition to reform the trust at issue and denied all of Mindy's petitions and motions. Sally subsequently filed a motion for reimbursement of attorney fees and expenses, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding (1) the circuit court was authorized to award Sally attorney fees under S.D. Codified Laws 15-17-38; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the litigation did not provide the trust with an economic benefit; and (3) attorney fees were authorized for Sally's efforts to vindicate her father's intent. View "In re Petersen Trusts" on Justia Law

Stephen Ankuda, Esq., as the administrator of the Estate of Miriam Thomas, appealed a court order granting former guardian Paul Thomas’s motion to dismiss a decision of the probate division. The probate division ordered Thomas to reimburse his mother’s estate for what it described as damages incurred during his tenure as her financial guardian. However, the Vermont Supreme Court found the civil division did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the probate division’s order was not a final order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the civil division’s order and remanded to the probate division for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Miriam Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal from an order of the county court that ruled on Appellant's petition for trust administration, holding that the order from which Appellant attempted to appeal was not a final order.Appellant filed a petition for trust administration proceeding with regarding to a family trust. After the county court entered its order ruling on the petition Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county court's ruling was not a final order in the trust administration proceeding; and (2) therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal. View "In re Estate of Scaletta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the probate court denying a petition to assess state inheritance tax under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-2002(1)(b) on real property that Decedents had deeded to their daughter (Daughter) decades prior while continuing to exercise control over and paying taxes on the property until they died, holding that the property was subject to Nebraska inheritance tax under section 77-2002(1)(b).Daughter brought this petition to assess state inheritance taxes on the subject real property. The county court concluded that the property should not be included in the Decedents' estate for purposes of inheritance tax because it was not "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment, after his or her death." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the stipulated facts showed that Decedents intended to retain possession and enjoyment of the property until death; and (2) therefore, the property was subject to Nebraska inheritance tax under section 77-2002(1)(b). View "In re Estate of Lofgreen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition preventing the Honorable Christopher McCarthy, Judge of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, from enforcing an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to compel, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to determine the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information sought by Plaintiffs.The order granting Plaintiffs' motion to compel required an attorney employed by Defendant to appear at a deposition and respond to questions that Defendant claimed were subject to the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of prohibition, holding that determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information sought by Plaintiffs during the deposition was a required first step in analyzing whether to grant Plaintiffs' motion to compel. View "State ex rel. Antero Resources Corp. v. Honorable McCarthy" on Justia Law

Attorney DeWayne Johnston, on behalf of the late David Knapp, appealed the dismissal entered after the district court denied a motion to substitute Knapp’s widow as plaintiff under N.D.R.Civ.P. 25. Attorney DeWayne Johnston, on behalf of the late David Knapp, appeals from a dismissal judgment entered after the district court denied a motion to substitute Knapp’s widow as plaintiff under N.D.R.Civ.P. 25. This litigation began after the Minnesota Department of Revenue issued a third-party levy on securities held by Edward Jones for Knapp. Knapp sued the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue and Edward Jones in North Dakota seeking dissolution of the levy. Knapp subsequently commenced this lawsuit against Edward Jones requesting dissolution of the levy or a declaration that his securities were exempt from the levy. He also brought a conversion claim and requested damages. The district court ordered the case stayed pending arbitration under terms in Edward Jones account agreements. Knapp died during the stay. Edward Jones served Knapp’s counsel, Attorney Johnston, with a statement noting Knapp’s death. Attorney Johnston filed a motion on Knapp’s behalf requesting Knapp’s widow, Cabrini Knapp, be substituted as plaintiff under N.D.R.Civ.P. 25. The court held a hearing. After the hearing, the court denied the substitution motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court noted that ownership of the securities had transferred to Cabrini Knapp and her “rights are not extinguished by this order and there is no prejudice to her in denying the motion to substitute her as a party.” The North Dakota Supreme Court granted Edward Jones’ motion and dismissed the appeal, agreeing that Johnston could not appeal on behalf of a dead person. If Johnston was not authorized to file this appeal, his motion to substitute on appeal was moot. View "Knapp v. The Jones Financial Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting partial summary judgment to the Estate of Gale Iverson (the Estate) on its real property claims against Cherie Davidson-Eaton (Eaton), Mr. Iverson's caregiver, and ordering Eaton to, among other things, provide the Estate with an accounting, holding that there was no error.The Estate filed an action for an accounting and sought to recover property it alleged Eaton unlawfully transferred to herself. In response, Eaton filed a creditor's claim against the Estate, alleging that she had a right to compensation for services she rendered to Mr. Iverson while he was living. The district court consolidated the lawsuits, granted partial summary judgment to the Estate on its real property claims, denied Eaton's claims, found the Estate was entitled to lost rents and profits, and ordered Eaton to provide the Estate with an accounting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law. View "Davidson-Eaton v. Iversen" on Justia Law

Lester Randle died in 2009, and was survived by Dorothy, his wife of twenty-one years, and their son, Raymond Randle. Lester had previously been married to Ruthie Randle. Two children were born of that marriage: Tumika and Sylvester, the Appellants. Ruthie and Lester divorced in 1977 when the children were very young. Lester died intestate. Dorothy was granted letters of administration of Lester's estate in which she noted the “estate consist[ed] of no real property but ha[d] a potential claim for unliquidated damages arising out of” Lester’s death. The petition acknowledged the Appellants, as well as Dorothy and Raymond, as Lester’s heirs at law. Dorothy petitioned for a determination of heirship, adding that the estate consisted of a claim for benefits against the manufacturer of Granuflow/Natural Lyte arising from Lester’s use of the prescription drug. The petition further claimed that the Appellants were “not heirs at law of Lester Randle and [were] not entitled to any of the settlement proceeds,” but rather they “were born to a married man, putative father,” and Ruthie. At a hearing before the chancery court, Cederica Gilliam appeared, claiming to be Lester’s heir; DNA testing was ordered on Lester’s putative children. The chancery court ultimately determined that Cederica was Lester's biological child, and Appellants were not his legal heirs at law based on the cross-referencing of the DNA results. Accordingly, the court adjudged Dorothy and Raymond as Lester’s only heirs at law and awarded them equal shares in any distribution of property. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the chancery court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly considered the settlement proceeds from the wrongful-death claim as an asset of the estate. Second, the lower courts incorrectly considered the petition to determine heirs under Mississippi Code Sections 91-1-1 to -31 (Rev. 2021) instead of a determination of wrongful-death beneficiaries under Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13 (Rev. 2019). The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the appellate and chancery courts and remanded this case to the chancery court to determine the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Lester Randle under Section 11-7-13. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Lester Randle" on Justia Law

While divorce proceedings between plaintiff-appellee Arnold Johnson (Husband) and Jacquelyn Johnson (Wife) were pending, Wife changed the primary beneficiary of her individual retirement account (IRA) from Husband to her adult children, defendants-appellants Dirk Snow and Duff Snow (collectively, Children). She also opened a new individual transfer on death (TOD) account and designated Children as the primary beneficiaries. Wife died before the divorce was granted, and the action abated. Thereafter, Husband filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to enforce the automatic temporary injunction entered in the divorce action. The district court concluded that the IRA and the funds used to open the TOD account were marital property and, therefore, Wife's acts violated the automatic temporary injunction, 43 O.S.2011 § 110(A)(1)(a), and were ineffective. The district court granted summary judgment to Husband and ordered that he be reinstated as the primary beneficiary of Wife's IRA and awarded the proceeds of the TOD account. Children appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when the dissolution of marriage action abated, the district court was deprived of its jurisdiction to enforce the automatic temporary injunction. "It is undisputed that Children were designated as the primary beneficiaries at the time of Wife's death and, therefore, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." View "Johnson v. Snow" on Justia Law