Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Donald and Marjorie Woodfin married in 1997. At the time, Donald had two adult children, Kathleen (Kathy) Gestner and Ray Woodfin, and Marjorie had two adult children, Julie Divine and Colleen Shiras. Donald and Marjorie created the Woodfin Family Trust, a revocable trust, in 1999. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the 1999 Trust identified the primary beneficiaries as Ray, Kathy, Colleen, and Julie, who would receive a sum of money and any remaining assets in equal shares if either or both settlors were deceased. Marjorie amended the Trust several times following Donald’s death. In 2002, Marjorie’s changes included adding additional successor trustees. Marjorie was diagnosed with breast cancer in 2017. Julie drove Marjorie to meet with attorney Robert Green in Coeur d’Alene regarding another trust amendment. Green met with Marjorie alone. In the meeting, Marjorie explained that she was disappointed in her stepchildren because she believed they had treated her poorly since Donald’s death. Marjorie died on October 12, 2018, at age 92. After learning about Marjorie’s passing, Kathy called Julie to inquire about the Trust and Julie sent Kathy and Ray the May 29, 2018, letter. Kathy and Ray subsequently filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. Kathy and Ray requested the district court to declare the 2018 amendments were void due to Julie’s undue influence and order Julie to distribute $100,000 to Ray and $100,000 to Kathy. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the evidence “overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that Marjorie had full testamentary capacity when she amended the Trust on May 29, 2018.” Kathy and Ray timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment against Kathy and Ray. View "Gestner v. Divine" on Justia Law

Parker’s daughters sought the appointment of a conservator of their mother’s estate. Schwarcz, a professional fiduciary, was appointed as temporary conservator of Parker’s estate. Following mediation, Parker, her daughters, and Schwarcz entered into an agreement that provided for a less restrictive alternative. The court approved the settlement and terminated the temporary conservatorship. Parker’s counsel emailed Schwarcz’s counsel, requesting “all communications" between Schwarcz and anyone regarding Parker’s estate. Schwarcz’s counsel refused to comply. Parker filed a “Petition for Return of Property,” under Probate Code section 850, seeking communications between Schwarcz and any non-attorney, communications between Schwarcz and her attorney with or without copying or otherwise including another person, and documents related to the temporary conservatorship.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Parker’s petition as not authorized by Probate Code 850. “Personal property” as used in section 850 does not encompass communications and documents from the administration of her temporary conservatorship estate. The section's legislative history and the historical circumstances around the enactment of its predecessor statutes do not suggest the Legislature intended section 850 to be used by a claimant to obtain communications and documents generated by a temporary conservator. View "Parker v. Schwarcz" on Justia Law

A dispute over attorney fees arose from the probate proceedings of Eric Milo Hirning’s estate. Appellants challenged the district court’s affirmance of the magistrate court’s decision to allow the personal representatives to recover their legal expenses incurred in the administration of the estate, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-720. The Appellants also challenged the attorney fees awarded to the Respondents on intermediate appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Uzzle v. Estate of Eric Milo Hirning" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court declining to award prejudgment interest to the estate of Madeline A. Adlung (the Estate) following a remand to the county court for a redetermination of damages owed by Defendant, holding that there was no error in the district court's refusal to award interest on remand.Adelung's son, Kent Adelung, appealed from the decision of the county court finding him liable following an action for an equitable accounting sought by the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified. On remand, the Estate sought prejudgment interest. The county court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court did not err in not applying prejudgment interest under Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-104 to the amount of the modified judgment on remand. View "In re Estate of Adelung" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the S.D. Codified Laws chapter 21-65 does not create a private right of action that survives a vulnerable adult's death and that a predicate theft conviction is not required to maintain an action authorized under S.D. Codified Laws 22-46-13.Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of Richard Hermanek's estate, claiming that Defendants, who previously served as Hermanek's attorneys-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney (POA), breached their fiduciary duties under the POA and converted Hermanek's property to their own use. The district court certified a question of law addressing Defendants' claim that an action alleging abuse of a vulnerable adult does not survive the death of the adult at issue. The Supreme Court answered (1) a vulnerable adult or substitute petition has a private right of action for the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, but the private right of action cannot be commenced under chapter 21-65 after the vulnerable adult's death; and (2) financial exploitation remains actionable after a person's death under section 22-46-13, and a criminal conviction is not required as a predicate to a civil cause of action for exploitation. View "Hermanek-Peck v. Spry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will at issue in this case to probate and appointing an administrator for the estate of James A. Townsey but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.The circuit court admitted Townsey's will to probate, appointed an administrator for the estate, and awarded the proceeds of a brokerage account to a German charity. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly admitted the will to probate and appointed an administrator for Townsey's estate; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant on counts two and three of the complaint. View "Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V." on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Barnett appealed orders granting relief to Robert Lee Hull, Jr. Barnett and Hull are siblings and the sole legal heirs of their father, Robert Lee Hull, Sr. ("Robert"), who died testate. Pursuant to Robert's will, Hull and Barnett were listed as beneficiaries entitled to equal shares of his estate and Barnett was named personal representative of his estate. Hull filed a complaint against Barnett, arguing that in her role as "a partial caretaker of [Robert]" before his death, had exerted undue influence over Robert and had gained control of Robert's personal property and assets. According to Hull, in the absence of Barnett's purported misconduct, items that Barnett allegedly misappropriated would "have become part of [Robert's] estate." Barnett moved ti dismiss her brother's tort action, claiming that Hull's complaint in the tort action realleged claims purportedly "identical" to claims that Hull had previously asserted in the estate administration, which had been dismissed. The trial court granted Hull's motion in full and denied Barnett's motion to dismiss. On appeal, among other things, Barnett contended the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hull's claims in the tort action, which she described as "central to the administration of the estate," while the estate administration remained separately pending. In her filings to the Supreme Court, Barnett characterized Hull's claims as "seek[ing] to identify property which he alleges should have been considered property of the Estate ... in the [first-filed] estate administration." To this, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over matters relating to the pending estate administration, and lacked jurisdiction to enter the the injunctive order or the subsequent show-cause order compelling Barnett's compliance with the injunctive order. The Supreme Court thus reversed all orders entered by the trial court in the tort action and remanded the matter for that court to enter an order dismissing Hull's complaint. View "Barnett v. Hull" on Justia Law

Appellant in his capacity as Litigation Trustee for the Erickson Litigation Trust, appeals the dismissal of his avoidance and recovery claims under the bankruptcy laws. In broad terms, these claims seek avoidance of settlement releases approved in Delaware state court, as well as two payments related to Erickson Air-Crane, Inc.’s acquisition of Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. (EHI) (the “Evergreen Transaction”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims relating to the settlement releases and reversed in part the dismissal of the payments relating to the Evergreen Transaction itself. The court concluded that consistent with Besing and Erlewine, there was reasonable equivalence as a matter of law. The Delaware settlement “should not be unwound by the federal courts merely because of its unequal division of [settlement proceeds].” Further, the court wrote that Appellant’s attempt to attack the Delaware releases as actually fraudulent transfers also fails. The court wrote it saw no error in the lower court's conclusion that Appellant failed to adequately plead actual fraud, and his arguments on appeal do not convince the court otherwise. Moreover, the court found that acting in his specific capacity, Appellant is not enjoined by the Delaware settlement from asserting creditor claims that arose only under the Bankruptcy Code. View "Ogle v. Morgan, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the district court's order in this will contest, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees and expenses.The jury in this case found that the will at issue was invalid as the product of undue influence. The proponent of the will appealed, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. The opponent of the will cross-appealed, challenging an award of attorney fees and expenses purportedly awarded under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2481 and 30-2482. The Supreme Court vacated the attorney fees and expenses portion of the order and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the jury's undue influence finding was not unreasonable; (2) there was no error related to opposing counsel's reference to the admission of a challenged text message; and (3) the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the award of attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending the will contest proceeding. View "In re Estate of Koetter" on Justia Law

Charles Edward Rainwater, Jean Rainwater Loggins, The Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, and the Rainwater Marital Trust appealed a circuit court's final judgment enforcing a settlement agreement in the litigation involving four siblings and the family trusts. They challenged three aspects of the judgment: its enforcement of the settlement agreement, its denial of a motion to dissolve a prior order enforcing the settlement agreement, and its denial of a motion to quash a garnishment. Because the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on enforcement of the settlement agreement, because the prior enforcement order was improper, and because any award on which the garnishment could have been based was being reversed, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to all three aspects. View "The Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, et al. v. Rainwater" on Justia Law