Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Starr brought a probate petition challenging the actions of M. Thomas Ashbrook, who was acting as the trustee of the revocable trust of Jonathan’s father, Arnold Starr. The petition alleged that Ashbrook had wasted and misused trust assets by pursuing a meritless petition for instructions and using trust assets to fund litigation against Jonathan Starr and his brothers. Ashbrook responded by bringing a special motion to strike the surcharge cause of action pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court concluded the allegations of the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of activity protected by section 425.16 and denied Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion. Ashbrook appealed the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that the alleged waste and misuse of trust assets was the injury-producing activity allegedly giving rise to Ashbrook’s liability for breach of trust. Because the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of allegations of protected activity the Court affirmed the order denying Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion without addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Starr v. Ashbrook" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the validity of modified terms, made by agreement of the settlor and beneficiaries, for removal and/or replacement of a trustee by the beneficiaries of irrevocable inter vivos trusts. The trusts at issue were all created by Walter Garrison, “Settlor,” founder and CEO of CDI Corp., a successful computer serving company. The trusts all named Settlor’s son Mark Garrison and any children Mark would have as beneficiaries. In 2017, Settlor and Beneficiaries entered into agreements to modify the Trusts pursuant to section 7740.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act (“UTA”). Settlor passed away in February 2019. Proceeding under the modified provision, Beneficiaries acted to remove the existing independent co-trustees and to appoint Dr. Mairi Leining, Christina Zavell, and Michael Zavell in their place. The existing co-trustees, when notified of Beneficiaries’ action, advised that they did not recognize the modifications to the Trusts as valid or their purported removal thereunder. Seeking to uphold the co-trustee replacements, Mark filed a declaratory judgment petition to test the validity of the 2017 modifications. The Supreme Court determined the lower courts’ extension of its holding in Trust under Agreement of Edward Winslow Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017) to unified action of beneficiaries and settlor of a trust under section 7740.1(a) was improper. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Trust Under Deed of W. Garrison" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery denied Paul Petigrow's motion to dismiss the claims against him for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a share withdrawal (Count IV) and tortiously interfering with a trust instrument (Count V), holding that Petigrow was not entitled to relief.Plaintiffs were three of the children of Dr. Robert M Harris, Sr. and Mary Ellen Harris. Plaintiffs alleged that Mary Ellen and her advisors scheme to seize control of a family-owned corporation as Dr. Harris's health was failing. Petigrow, one of Mary Ellen's advisors, asserted that the Court of Chancery could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him for purposes of a claim for tortious interference with a trust instrument. The Court of Chancery denied his motion to dismiss, holding (1) the exercise of personal jurisdiction for purposes of Count V was consistent with traditional notions of due process, and the claim stated a claim against Pedigrow; and (2) Pedigrow's motion to dismiss Count IV was moot. View "Harris v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the district court dismissing this lawsuit brought by Cheryl Mueller to halt the pursuit of a setoff against the share of the estate of Lorine Mueller that would otherwise pass to Cheryl, holding that the merits of Cheryl's lawsuit should not have been entertained.At issue in this dispute over the administration of Lorine's estate (Estate) was whether a Nebraska judgment entered in favor of Lorine and against Cheryl, the widow of Lorine's deceased son, should be set off against the share of the Estate that would otherwise pass to Cheryl. In her complaint, Cheryl sought to halt the pursuit of a setoff by seeking a declaration that an agreement between Cheryl and Lorine's daughter, Margo Loop, precluded setoff. The district court dismissed this action with prejudice on summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court abused its discretion to the extent it reached the merits of this action. View "Mueller v. Peetz" on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky"), deceased, appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's dismissal with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. Ms. Bashinsky was the widow of Sloan Bashinsky, who owned the majority stock in Golden Enterprises, Inc., and who was the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Golden Flake Foods ("Golden Flake"). McKleroy and Townsend, two former Golden Flake employees who had professional relationships with Ms. Bashinsky, alleged that Ms. Bashinsky was incapable of caring for herself and for her assets, which were then valued at approximately $218 million. McKleroy and Townsend's allegations of Ms. Bashinsky's incompetence centered on her request that Level Four Advisory Services LLC, which held approximately $35 million of Ms. Bashinsky's personal assets, transfer $17.5 million to David Heath at investment firm Morgan Stanley. McKleroy and Townsend further alleged that the transferred assets would end up being controlled by Ms. Bashinsky's grandson, Landon Ash, whom they alleged had already accumulated $23.5 million in total indebtedness to Ms. Bashinsky and whom they alleged exerted undue influence upon Ms. Bashinsky. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss. The Court determined the order awarding attorney fees was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, Erskine's appeal was dismissed, and the matter remanded for the probate court to enter a proper final judgment in this case. View "Erskine v. Guin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Russell Davis, Ian Herzog, Evan Marshall, Debra Wear, Gloria Tedesco, and Stephen Carpenter appealed a March 22, 2021 trial court order, which denied each of their special motions to strike (anti- SLAPP) the corresponding applications for elder abuse restraining orders (EARO) filed by plaintiff-appellant Laura White (White), as cotrustee of the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust (the living trust), to protect her father, conservatee Thomas Tedesco (Thomas) from defendants’ concerted efforts to isolate and unduly influence him to change his estate plan for their benefit. White cross-appealed the same order denying her request to hear the EARO applications prior to the anti-SLAPP motions. Defendants contended that: (1) White had no standing to request the EAROs because she was unable to establish that she was either a trustee of the living trust or fiduciary of Thomas; (2) the lower court erred in assuming the conservatorship was valid and White was a cotrustee of the living trust, and relying on the Court of Appeal's opinions affirming the probate court’s actions; (3) the court erred by denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions; (4) their assistance in asserting Thomas’s civil and testamentary rights cannot be restrained by an EARO to prevent them from seeking a judicial determination that will resolve the very issue raised by the EARO; (5) the EAROs had to be stricken because they interfered with Orange County’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction; and (6) the court erred in proceeding without joinder by Thomas. White asserted Wear’s anti-SLAPP motion was moot given the Court of Appeal's affirmance of the EARO against her, the anti-SLAPP motions were properly denied, and defendants’ remaining contentions lacked merit. In her cross-appeal, she argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to rule on her applications before deciding the anti-SLAPP motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying each special motion to strike; however, it concluded the trial court abused its discretion in failing to utilize its case management tools and prevent a delay in hearing the merits of the applications for EAROs by failing to either: (1) revisit the prior denial of temporary EAROs and grant temporary relief pending the resolution of defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions (through appeal); or (2) decide the applications and the anti-SLAPP motions at the same time. Thus, the matter was remanded for the trial court to proceed to trial on White’s applications for EAROs regarding all defendants except Wear, against whom an EARO was already in place. View "White v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the claims brought by the Estate of Owen Thacker against Victoria Timm, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The parties in this case were involved romantically, lived with each each other, and owned property as joint tenants. After Plaintiffs were appointed co-guardians and co-conservators of Thacker they filed this suit on behalf of Thacker against Timm, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and undue influence. The Estate was substituted as Plaintiff and added a claim for breach of duty as trustee of implied trust. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Timm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "Estate of Thacker v. Timm" on Justia Law

In 2017, Michael Tharaldson died and a probate action was opened to administer his estate. Tharaldson was unmarried and had three children, including E.M. The district court found he died intestate. In 2019, Bell Bank filed this action petitioning for a determination of trust beneficiaries and approval of asset distribution. Bell Bank claimed the sole beneficiary was Michael Tharaldson’s brother, Matthew Tharaldson. E.M. objected to the petition. E.M. appeals the ultimate order finding Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary of the Michael J. Tharaldson Irrevocable Trust Agreement II (“Trust II”) and was entitled to the trust assets. E.M. argues he was a beneficiary under the Michael J. Tharaldson Irrevocable Trust Agreement (“Trust I”), Trust I was unlawfully merged with Trust II, the trustee engaged in illegal trust decanting, and he was entitled to attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary under the plain language of either trust, and E.M. was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. View "Matter of Michael J. Tharaldson Trust" on Justia Law

In this dispute over ownership of some ranchland the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that a grantor conveys an expectancy interest only through a clear manifestation of the grantor's intent to do so, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Father devised his estate, including Cottonwood Ranch, to Widow for life with the remainder upon her death to his children, including Son. Father granted Widow power to sell estate property and to redirect a child's remainder interest to others. Widow, a co-owner of the ranch, later conveyed her separate interest in the ranch to Son and daughter. Thereafter, while Widow was still living, Son conveyed his "right, title and interest in and to" the ranch to his daughters. At issue was whether Son gifted a remainder interest in Father's estate property when he conveyed his present interest in the same property without expressly reserving any remainder interest. Applying the rule set forth in Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1942), the Supreme Court held that Son did not convey his remainder interest in the estate property. View "Jordan v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law