Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In Wyoming, Darrell R. Turcato and Robbin D. Wilkins (Appellants) and Jan Frady and Larry Turcato (Petitioners) were beneficiaries of two trusts created by their parents. The Appellants sought to appeal the district court's decision that a warranty deed executed by the Trusts transferring property to them was invalid due to a defective acknowledgment. The property in question was a house, which was held 50% by the JT Trust and 50% by the VT Trust. The mother, Virginia Turcato, decided to transfer the house to the Appellants in recognition of their assistance. However, her signature was notarized outside her presence. After her death, the Petitioners sought a declaration that the transfer was invalid due to the defective acknowledgment. The district court determined that the Petitioners, as beneficiaries of the trusts, had an interest in the property when the deed was executed and therefore declared the warranty deed void against them.The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that a defective acknowledgment does not render a warranty deed void ab initio under Wyoming law. It found that when the parties signed the Warranty Deed, title immediately passed to Appellants, and that title was valid against all but certain parties. The Court also held that the Petitioners did not have an interest in the property at the time of the transfer and therefore had no standing to challenge the Warranty Deed. The Court concluded that the Warranty Deed is valid between the Trusts and the Appellants, and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. View "Turcato v. Frady" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed a district court decision denying Chad Hanson's petition to be recognized as the heir of the late Arlen Lindberg. Lindberg died intestate, and Hanson filed a petition alleging that he was Lindberg's biological son, substantiating his claim with an affidavit from his mother and DNA testing results showing a 99.7% chance of relation to Lindberg's biological brother. The Lindberg family opposed the petition, arguing that Lindberg's parental rights were terminated when Hanson was adopted by his stepfather. The district court ruled in favor of the Lindberg family, interpreting North Dakota's Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Parentage Act to require that a paternity action commence within two years of birth, which was not the case for Hanson. However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the district court had applied the law incorrectly. The Supreme Court ruled that the Uniform Probate Code allows for establishing a "genetic father" through genetic testing or the Uniform Parentage Act, and that the act of adoption does not equate to an adjudication of paternity. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Lindberg" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Mrs. Tokowitz the right to a spousal election against her late husband's will. The late Mr. Tokowitz had left his estate to a revocable trust and made no provision for Mrs. Tokowitz in his will. The court held that Mrs. Tokowitz was not deprived of her spousal election right simply because her husband's property was transferred to his trust through a pour-over will. The court reasoned that property transferred by a pour-over will is part of the decedent's probate estate until the will is probated. Only after probate does it pass in accordance with section 2-6-103 to the trust to be distributed by the trust terms. The court also found that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming at the time of his death, as evidenced by his will, making Mrs. Tokowitz eligible for the spousal election under Wyoming law. The court declined to rule on Mrs. Tokowitz's rights as a beneficiary under the trust, stating that issues relating to the trust were outside of its jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Tokowitz v. Tokowi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island heard an appeal by Kelly Maltais contesting the dismissal of her probate appeal by the Superior Court. Kelly challenged the last will and testament of her father, Laurent E. Maltais, alleging fraud, duress, and undue influence, and asserting that her father lacked testamentary capacity. Kelly's probate appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court on the grounds that it was filed 32 days after the probate court order, two days beyond the statutory 30-day limit for appeal. Kelly argued that the 30th day fell on a Saturday, and under Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, she had until the following Monday to file her appeal.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Superior Court, ruling that the computation of time for the 30-day deadline is tolled when the last day for filing falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in order to give appellants the full benefit of all the time allowed, even if it necessitates giving an additional day. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Maltais v. Maltais" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, UMB Bank, N.A. (UMB) filed a complaint against Jessie Benton and her children, alleging that they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by committing acts of mail, wire, and bank fraud. The dispute arose from the management of a family trust, which included works of art, real estate, and personal effects. The beneficiaries of the trust accused UMB of mismanagement and sued UMB in a separate Missouri state court case. UMB then filed this federal case, arguing that the beneficiaries and their attorney engaged in fraudulent activities to force UMB to increase trust distributions or resign as trustee.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss UMB's complaint for failure to state a civil RICO claim. The court agreed that UMB failed to sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity. Although UMB might be able to prove that three communications to media outlets qualify as predicate acts of mail, wire, or bank fraud, these acts did not show a pattern of racketeering activity because they occurred within a few days and targeted a single victim (UMB). The court also affirmed the district court's denial of UMB's post-judgment motions for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendment was both untimely and futile. View "UMB Bank v. Guerin" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Carmody (appellant) and the estate of his deceased nephew, Robert Allen Flores. Initially, Donald was informed by an heir-hunting firm, American Research Bureau, Inc. (ARB), that he was an heir to his nephew's estate. However, believing it was a scam, Donald assigned his rights to the estate to his brother, John Carmody. The estate, however, turned out to be valuable. John filed a petition under Probate Code section 11700 to determine the entitlement to the distribution of the nephew's estate, which resulted in a determination that both John and Donald were the nephew's heirs, with each entitled to a 50% share. However, John died before the court issued the final distribution order.The administrator of the nephew's estate sought a final distribution order that would take into account Donald's assignment of his rights to John. Donald objected, claiming that the previous order determining the entitlement to distribution was final and prohibited the court from recognizing his prior assignment of his interest to John. The trial court rejected this claim, ruling that it properly recognized Donald's assignment of his interest in the estate to John.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that John's rights as an assignee were not raised or litigated in the section 11700 proceeding, which was limited to a determination of heirship. Thus, John did not forfeit or waive his rights as an assignee by failing to assert those rights in the section 11700 proceeding. The court also found that Donald failed to establish evidence of rescission of the assignment. View "In re Estate of Flores" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between Dominic and Eric Jr., the grandchildren of the settlor of the Lena Grace Hamilton Trust, and their aunt, LaDonna Green, the initial trustee of the trust. After the death of Lena Grace Hamilton, the trust's settlor, LaDonna informed Dominic and Eric Jr. that she was the sole beneficiary of the trust. However, Dominic and Eric Jr. believed the trust amendment that made LaDonna the sole beneficiary was forged. They filed a lawsuit alleging forgery and other claims more than a year after they received notice from LaDonna about the trust and its terms. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Four, held that Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was an action to contest the trust under Probate Code section 16061.8. This section imposes a 120-day statute of limitations for bringing such an action, which starts running from the day the notification by the trustee is served. Since Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was filed more than a year after they received the notification, the court ruled that their action was time-barred under section 16061.8. The court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which had sustained LaDonna's demurrer (a motion to dismiss) without leave to amend, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. View "Hamilton v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information. View "Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law