Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court determining that Denise Schipke-Smeenk was not entitled to specific performance of an agreement she made with her husband that neither party would revoke their specific wills without the other's consent, holding that the circuit court erred in determining that the claim was not timely or properly presented.Denise and Neil Smeenk executed mutual wills in 2017 and the agreement at issue. In 2019, Neil executed a new will without Denise's consent. After Neil died, the circuit court appointed Denise as personal representative of Neil's estate and ordered the 2019 will to be probated. The circuit court denied Denise's motion seeking specific performance of the agreement, determining that the motion was not properly presented as a creditor claim and was untimely and that Denise was not entitled to specific performance. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in determining that the claim was not timely and properly presented; but (2) correctly ruled that Denise was not entitled to specific performance. View "In re Estate of Smeenk" on Justia Law

Allen earned a Ph.D. in physics from Yale University in 1965 and embarked on a successful career in the aerospace industry. He retired in 2004 and granted a financial power of attorney to his daughter, Key, when he and his wife experienced declining health and he could no longer manage their finances. For several years Key used the power of attorney to make withdrawals from Allen’s investment accounts held by affiliated investment firms (Brown). Five years later Allen revoked the power of attorney and sued Brown, raising contract and fiduciary-duty claims under Maryland law. He alleged that Key’s withdrawals (or some of them) were not to his benefit and that the investment companies should not have honored them.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Maryland Court of Appeals has clarified that a plaintiff may plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty even when another cause of action (like breach of contract) is available to redress the conduct. . Still, the power of attorney shields Brown from liability for breach of fiduciary duty just as it does for breach of contract. Brown had no fiduciary obligation to refuse to carry out transactions authorized by the power of attorney. View "Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC" on Justia Law

Gayle died in 2006. Attorney Johnston filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions on behalf of Gayle in 2016 and 2018 at the request of Gayle’s daughter, Elizabeth, the Administratrix of her mother’s probate estate. After the dismissal of the 2018 petition, Elizabeth, pro se, filed three Chapter 13 petitions on Gayle’s behalf. The Chapter 13 Trustee sought sanctions against Bagsby after she filed yet another Chapter 13 petition.The bankruptcy court ordered Johnston to show cause why he should not be subject to sanctions for filing the two Chapter 13 petitions on behalf of a deceased person. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court reopened the first two cases and issued sanctions sua sponte against Johnston and Bagsby. The bankruptcy court determined that Johnston failed to conduct any inquiries or legal research, there was no basis in existing law to support a reasonable possibility of success, and the cases were filed for the express purpose of delaying foreclosure actions. The bankruptcy court concluded Johnston violated Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sanctions order. Johnson had admitted to the factual findings. The bankruptcy court was not required to find that Johnson acted in bad faith, in a manner “akin to contempt of court,” or with a specific mens rea but only whether Johnston’s conduct was reasonable. View "Johnston v. Hildebrand" on Justia Law

In these two original actions the Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt certain paragraphs of its order.Two brothers, who were coexecutors of their deceased father's estate, sought writs of prohibition to prevent the judge of the general division from enforcing her order memorializing a settlement in a judicial-dissolution action, arguing that they were not bound by the order because the general division lacked both subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order and personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the general division patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt the paragraphs of its order directing the brothers to take actions as coexecutors. View "Neiman v. LaRose" on Justia Law

After Royals’ father, Adams, died at age 99, Royals became the successor trustee and sole beneficiary of the Adams Trust. Lu, Adams’s second wife, was 59 years old when she married Adams, then 95. Royals alleged that Adams intended to leave none of his assets to Lu. Lu claims Adams intended to provide for her support by depositing certain funds in certain accounts under Lu’s control outside of the Trust. A pretrial right to attach order was issued against Lu under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600).The court of appeal reversed. The prospect of punitive recovery on a financial elder abuse claim (exemplary damages or statutory penalties) may not be secured by the extraordinary remedy of pretrial attachment. A financial elder abuse claimant may obtain an attachment for potential compensatory damages and an award of attorney fees and costs associated with those damages only if the request for it complies with all applicable provisions of the statutory scheme governing pretrial attachments (Code Civ. Proc. 481.010). Royals’s attachment application did not comply with four provisions of the Attachment Law. Royals failed to support her prayer for compensatory damages with competent evidence; to the extent she sought an attachment for prospective recovery of punitive damages and statutory penalties in addition to compensatory damages, her attachment request also failed to comply with the attachable amount, attachable claim, and claimed indebtedness requirements. View "Royals v. Lu" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District resolved three appeals, referred to as the 270 Action and the other as 475 Action.   In the 270 Action, the trial court sustained special motions to strike Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant and her counsel, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1)1 (i.e., anti-SLAPP motions). The trial court further awarded Defendant and her attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). The first 270 Appeal (No. B308337) is of the trial court’s judgment following its order on the anti-SLAPP motions. The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits in the 270 Action because, under the circumstances presented, he lacked standing to bring a malicious prosecution claim with respect to an action that had not been prosecuted against him. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.   The 475 Appeal (No. B307242) is of an order entered by the probate court dismissing Defendant’s creditor’s petition for a finder’s fee in the 475 Action. This order was rendered primarily on a misapplication of the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Second Appellate District reversed this order and remanded to the probate court for further proceedings. By their cross-appeal, Plaintiff and his attorney appeal an order directing the attorney to pay expenses for repeated violations of the probate court’s page limit rules. The Second Appellate District found that the probate court acted within its authority in directing such payment and therefore affirm View "Tukes v. Richard CA2/" on Justia Law

Relator—the decedent’s personal representative—brought a wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020 that sought, among other things, damages on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries for their loss of decedent’s society and companionship. The trial court entered an order under ORCP 44 C requiring the beneficiaries to produce records of their medical and psychological care that was relevant to those alleged damages. Relator filed a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed, arguing that the beneficiaries’ records were privileged, and that ORCP 44 C could not require disclosure because that rule applied to claims made for “damages for injuries to the party,” and the beneficiaries were not parties. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling was in error. As a matter of law, the Court held that statutory beneficiaries of a wrongful death claim were not, by virtue of that status, “parties” who could be compelled under ORCP 44 C to provide privileged records. View "Dahlton v. Kyser" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Newton appealed his convictions by jury on three counts of exploitation of an elderly, disabled, or impaired adult in violation of RSA 631:9, I(a) (2016) and RSA 631:10 (2016). Defendant became trustee of the Newton Family Trust and retained power of attorney over both the victim (defendant’s mother) and her husband (defendant’s father) in 2014 as a result of their failing health. The Trust created a fiduciary duty in the trustee and specified that the assets and money held by the Trust were to be used only for the benefit of the victim and her husband until their death. The victim’s husband died on December 21, 2015. By July 2017, the New Hampshire Attorney General had launched an investigation into allegations that defendant exploited the victim for large sums of money. Defendant argued the trial court erred when, at trial, it excluded out-of-court statements made by the defendant’s parents and a financial planner. He also appealed the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a hearing to review and reconsider the sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "New Hampshire v. Newton" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action in which the personal representative of the Estate of Victoria Smith (the “Personal Representative”) sought to eject Riverside Farms, LLC, (“Riverside”) from its real property, referred to by the parties as the “Chinden Property,” after the term of Riverside’s lease expired. Riverside argued that the Personal Representative lacked standing to bring the ejectment action because it was not the true owner of the land. The Personal Representative was earlier granted ownership of the “Chinden Property” pursuant to a Rule 70(b) judgment issued during the probate proceedings following Victoria’s death. Riverside argued that the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata because a prior action, which concerned removal of trees along an easement on the property, had already confirmed that the Personal Representative was not the true owner of the Chinden Property. The district court determined that ejectment of Riverside was proper because the dismissal of the prior case did not preclude the Rule 70(b) judgment issued in the probate case. Riverside filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its decision, but the district court declined to do so. Riverside appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the denial of its motion to reconsider was in error and renewing its argument that the personal representative lacked standing to seek removal of Riverside from the property because the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Elsaesser v. Riverside Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a contentious family dispute over the effect of an in terrorem clause in a trust instrument that was executed by David Slosberg (“David”), which said that if his son, Robert Slosberg (“Plaintiff”), or daughters, Suzanne Giller and Lynne Amy Seidner (“Defendants”), challenged the trust, they would forfeit any benefits they were to receive from it. After David died, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, that Defendants unduly influenced David to create the trust that contained the in terrorem clause, and at a trial in June 2019, the jury agreed. The trial court accordingly entered an order ruling that the trust instrument was void. Defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, among other things, that the in terrorem clause contained in the trust instrument precluded Plaintiff from asserting the undue-influence claim in the first place. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the in terrorem clause barred Plaintiff’s claim and resulted in his forfeiture of any benefits from the trust. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred by determining that the in terrorem clause barred Plaintiff’s undue-influence claim and resulted in forfeiture of the assets the trust instrument otherwise provided. That part of the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings at the trial court. View "Slosberg v. Giller, et al." on Justia Law