Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether distributions from a Delaware statutory trust to beneficial owners were subject to garnishment by a creditor. The beneficial owners argued Delaware law prohibited garnishment of the distributions because they were trust property. They also argued that Delaware law prohibited garnishment of the distributions because the trust was a spendthrift trust. The creditor contended the appeal was moot because the trust converted to a partnership. As to the merits, the creditor contended the distributions were personal property subject to garnishment, not trust property. They further argued the beneficial owners failed to argue below that the trust was a spendthrift trust; thus, they were barred from raising that argument on appeal.Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held: (1) the appeal was not moot; (2) the trust distributions were personal property subject to garnishment; and (3) the appellants waived the argument that the trust at issue was a spendthrift trust. Thus, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Protech Minerals, Inc. v. Dugout Team, LLC" on Justia Law

Ramsey Walter El Wardani died intestate in 2016 and was survived by his wife Janine and daughter from a previous marriage, Alexandria (Ali). Four years into a protracted probate dispute between Janine and Ali, the court removed Janine as court-appointed administrator of Ramsey’s estate. It deemed her ineligible to serve in that role because it found that she was not a United States (U.S.) resident as required by California Probate Code section 8402(a)(4). Emphasizing her numerous ties to California, Janine appealed her removal as administrator of her deceased husband’s estate. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the trial court reasonably rejected her claim to U.S. residency despite those ties. Janine sold her home in California and moved with Ramsey to Mexico in 2014 intending to retire there. She remained in Mexico “full time” for two years until Ramsey’s death. Although she returned to California for visits thereafter, she did not relocate or plan to move back to the U.S. until the probate case was over. View "Estate of El Wardani" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding Georgia’s fiduciary duty to disclose.(1) If a confidential relationship creates a duty to disclose which, if breached, would constitute fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, would that duty to disclose also support a breach of fiduciary duty tort claim under Georgia law?(2) If so, may an adult fiduciary in a confidential relationship with a minor beneficiary without a written agreement discharge his duty to disclose by disclosing solely to the minor’s parents or guardians?(3) If the adult fiduciary does have an obligation to disclose to the minor beneficiary directly without a written agreement, when must the adult fiduciary disclose or redisclose to the minor beneficiary? View "Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying the motions filed by Kristina Libbert and Darren Hickey to intervene in the underlying petition challenging the validity of an amendment to the Shirley A. Hickey Trust and for clarification and reconsideration, holding that a portion of the order denying the motion for clarification and reconsideration must be vacated.Nearly one year after Bradley Hickey filed a petition challenging the validity of an amendment to the Shirley A. Hickey Trust Kristina and Darren moved to intervene in the petition. The circuit court denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely. Thereafter, Kristina and Darren filed their motion for clarification and reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the order denying intervention, holding that remand was required to consider the timeliness of the motion to intervene under the standards set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-24(a)(2); and (2) vacated the portion of the circuit court's order on the motion for clarification and reconsideration, holding that the trial court must reconsider this order after reconsidering Kristina and Darren's request for intervention. View "In re Hickey Living Trust" on Justia Law

A conservator was appointed after the minor children’s grandmother had already brought a wrongful-death lawsuit on their behalf. The conservator tried in various ways to exercise his litigation powers, with the goal of dismissing the grandmother’s lawsuit and bringing a similar one in a different county. The conservator was eventually joined as an “involuntary plaintiff” in the grandmother’s lawsuit, and his further attempts to gain control of the litigation, in that court and others, were rejected. He appealed several rulings unfavorable to him, but the Court of Appeals concluded that he had forfeited his exclusive power under OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) earlier in the case when he declined to join the grandmother’s case voluntarily and sought its dismissal. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a conservator who declines to join preexisting litigation voluntarily and seeks to have that litigation dismissed does not thereby forfeit his exclusive power to participate in that litigation after he is joined as a party under OCGA § 9-11- 19 (a). So the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding, vacated the parts of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affected by it, and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Hall, et al. v. Davis Lawn Care Service, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

King is Jimmy's former spouse and mother of his minor child. Jimmy was killed in a California helicopter crash. His sole heirs were his spouse, Wasdin, and his minor child. Jimmy and King were residents of Alabama. An Alabama probate court named King as the personal representative of Jimmy’s estate. King filed a California wrongful death suit. Wasdin moved to intervene; Code Civil Procedure 387(d)(1)(B)) provides that a court “shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene” if “[t]he person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction" and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair that person’s ability to protect that interest unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. King asserted the one-action rule, which precludes an heir from filing an independent action after a decedent’s personal representative has filed suit for wrongful death, and that any complaints about the inadequacy of her representation of Wasdin’s interest should be addressed by the Alabama probate court.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Wasdin’s motion. An heir must be granted leave to intervene as a matter of right so long as the statutory requirements for intervention have been met. The trial court denied the motion on the incorrect basis that there was no legal authority allowing an heir to intervene in a wrongful death action filed by the personal representative and failed to consider whether the heir’s interests were adequately represented by the personal representative. View "King v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

Ball Healthcare Services, Inc. ("Ball Healthcare"), appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration in Ledell Flennory's wrongful-death suit against it. Because the Alabama Supreme Court determined Flennory did not meet his burden of rebutting Ball Healthcare's evidence that an enforceable arbitration agreement existed, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Ball Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Flennory" on Justia Law

In this case involving the extent of a a trustee's duties and powers concerning litigation challenging trust amendments the Supreme Court held that the subject trustee had the power to defend the litigation and that the court of appeals erred by applying N.C. Gen. Stat. 31-36, a statute applicable to will caveats, to this trust proceeding.Plaintiffs brought this litigation seeking to set aside certain amendments to a Trust created by the decedent. Plaintiffs sought relief against the trustee, Goldman Sachs Trust Co., N.A., for what they claimed were invalid distributions to defendant beneficiaries. Defendant beneficiaries sought an order directing Goldman Sachs to pay them the costs of defending the Trust, after which one plaintiff filed a motion to "Freeze Administration of Revocable Trust Until Beneficiaries Are Determined or...to Pay Defense Costs for All Purported Beneficiaries." The trial court granted the motions to pay. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order allowing the motion to freeze. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err by instructing Goldman Sachs to pay defendant beneficaries' litigation expenses as distributions in this action; and (2) a duty to defend under N.C. Gen. Stat. 36C-8-811 arises only when the action may result in a loss to the trust estate. View "Wing v. Goldman Sachs Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

Lester Randle died in 2009, survived by his wife and son, Dorothy and Raymond. Lester had previously been married to Ruthie Randle. Two children were born of that marriage: Tumika and Sylvester, the Appellants. Ruthie and Lester divorced in 1977 when the children were very young. Lester died intestate. On May 7, 2018, Dorothy filed a petition for grant of letters of administration in which she noted that Lester’s “estate consist[ed] of no real property but ha[d] a potential claim for unliquidated damages arising out of” Lester’s death. The petition acknowledged the Appellants, as well as Dorothy and Raymond, as Lester’s heirs at law. Dorothy was appointed administrator on July 12, 2018. On November 19, 2018, Dorothy filed a petition for a determination of heirship, now asserting that the estate consisted of a claim for benefits against the manufacturer of Granuflow/Natural Lyte in the amount of $67,500.25 arising from Lester’s use of the prescription drug. The petition further claimed that the Appellants were “not heirs at law of Lester Randle and [were] not entitled to any of the settlement proceeds,” but rather they “were born to a married man, putative father,” and Ruthie. A summons by publication was submitted in the newspaper to any unknown heirs. The Court of Appeals affirmed a chancellor's adjudication that Dorothy and Raymond were Lester's only heirs at law. The issues this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether the chancery court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly considered the settlement proceeds from a wrongful-death claim as an asset of the estate; and (2) whether the chancery court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly considered the petition to determine heirs under Mississippi Code Sections 91-1-1 to -31 (Rev. 2021) instead of a determination of wrongful-death beneficiaries under Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13 (Rev. 2019). The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and chancery court and remanded this case to the chancery court to determine the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Lester under Section 11-7-13. View "Randle v. Randle" on Justia Law

Decedent was an unnamed class member in an action involving alleged misrepresentations made by Defendants while marketing, selling, administering, and servicing various life insurance and annuity products. After the class member died her Estate commenced an action asserting various contract, fraud, and elder abuse claims pertaining to Decedent’s 1989 purchase of a purported “single-premium universal life insurance policy.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement and enjoined the Estate from pursuing the Oregon claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained to effectuate service under Rule 4, a party may either follow state law where service is made or fulfill one of the following: (a) deliver a copy to the individual personally; (b) leave a copy at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (c) deliver a copy to an authorized agent. Here, the personal representative (a nonparty) was served with the motion to substitute in a manner provided by Rule 4, received notice in compliance with Rule 25(a), and was properly brought within the jurisdiction of the Minnesota district court.Further, beyond the Estate’s self-serving statements, there is no evidence suggesting Defendants did not follow the approved procedures. Finally, the court held that upon careful review of the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the doctrines of laches and unclean hands were inapplicable under the facts and circumstances of this case. View "Marjory Thomas Osborn-Vincent v. American Express Financial" on Justia Law