Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioner David Apostoloff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition to validate a purported amendment to the Omega Trust. He contended the court erred in dismissing his petition by finding the grantor did not substantially comply with the terms of the trust regarding amendments, and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the grantor intended to amend his trust. Taking all of the facts alleged in the petition as true, and applying them against the applicable law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the allegations constituted a basis for legal relief. Thus, petitioner has sufficiently pled his case to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re The Omega Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a beneficiary and ruling that an amendment to an irrevocable trust was invalid, holding that the surviving settlor of an irrevocable trust cannot, with the consent of all of the beneficiaries, modify the dispositive terms of an irrevocable trust without court approval.Donald and Collen Davis established the trust at issue. After Collen died, Donald sought to amend the dispositive terms of the trust. Donald and his four children signed a consent document on different days and then Donald executed an amendment altering the disposition of the trust estate. Katina Little, one of the children, brought this action challenging the validity of the amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for Little, concluding that the amendment to the trust agreement was void for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the consent of Donald and the four beneficiaries was insufficient to modify the trust after Collen's death. View "Little v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the beneficiary of an estate cannot file a separate suit outside probate against the personal representative of the estate for claims arising out of and related to the personal representative's fees for administering the estate.After Roger Rand died testate, attorney Larry Storm informed Security National Bank that it had been nominated as the personal representative of the estate. Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the estate, later received a document entitled "Estate Administration Overview" that included a statement regarding fees for the estate's administration. The document reflected the maximum fees for ordinary services that a personal representative could receive. Plaintiff objected, arguing that Security National deprived the beneficiaries of the opportunity to replace the personal representative with another that required a smaller fee. The probate court reduced the fees to Security National below the requested amounts. Plaintiff then brought this suit against Security National arising from Security National's service as the personal representative of the estate. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims should have been asserted in the probate court or otherwise failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Security National on all claims. View "Rand v. Security National Corp." on Justia Law

Brandy filed a probate petition seeking to be appointed the personal representative of her late husband’s (Scott) estate. The trial court denied her petition based on a premarital agreement that waived Brandy’s interests in her husband’s separate property. The court named his parents as co-administrators of the estate. The court of appeal held Brandy was entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence in support of her argument that she and her late husband mistakenly believed the premarital agreement would apply only in the event of divorce, rather than upon death. On remand, the trial court found that the mistake was a unilateral mistake on Brandy’s part and that she was not entitled to rescission. The court expressly found “there was insufficient evidence that Scott encouraged or fostered Brandy’s mistaken belief.”The court of appeal affirmed. Because Brandy failed to read the agreement and meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. View "Estate of Eskra" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner, executor of the estate of Virginia Durkin, against Respondent, the judge presiding over the underlying action involving the Durkin estate, holding that Respondent was not entitled to the writ.Petitioner attempted to appeal a prior order appointing a special master commissioner, arguing that Respondent's appointment of the special master commissioner under Ohio Rev. Code 2101.06 disregarded the law of the case established in prior proceedings. After the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order Petitioner brought the instant original action. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the appeal court's mandate was not violated in this case. View "Durkin v. Williams" on Justia Law

Allen Betz and Timothy Betz (“the Betzes”) appealed a district court’s order finding them to be vexatious litigants and requiring them to obtain leave of court prior to filing documents in any new or existing litigation. The Betzes also argued the court erred in issuing a July 16, 2008 order reforming the Emelia Hirsch June 9, 1994, Irrevocable Trust. After review, the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the district court’s deemed denial of Allen Betz’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b); (2) vacated that portion of the court’s September 30, 2021 order finding Allen Betz a vexatious litigant, and remanded to the presiding judge for further consideration; (3) dismissed Timothy Betz’s appeal, because denial of leave to file was not appealable. The Court awarded double costs and attorney’s fees of $500 to the Trustees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the circuit court affirming the district court's order liquidating a trust's assets, holding that the order was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, and unsupported by sound legal principles.J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., obtained a Jefferson District Court Court order that improperly directed the Bank to liquidate certain trust assets and pay them into the Jefferson Registry of Court. The circuit court affirmed the district court's action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Bank violated its statutory and fiduciary duties by liquidating the trust's assets when the legislature has provided an adequate mechanism and remedy for the settlement and distribution of trust assets; and (2) as a remedy, the district court is to order an accounting and appropriate damages. View "Estate of Worrall v. J.P. Morgan Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A charitable trust controls the intellectual property of Narcotics Anonymous. This trust is revocable. A group called the Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anonymous alleged the trustee breached its fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs argued that a Probate Code section confers standing on entities with the power to revoke a trust. Plaintiffs claimed that Autonomous Region is a settlor with that power and that they have special interest standing. The probate court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend finding Autonomous Region lacked standing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that the probate court properly concluded leave to amend would have been futile. The court held that the trust document does not confer standing, reasoning that the document defines the settlor as an amorphous group—the Fellowship of Narcotics Anonymous—that acts through delegates who represent groups within the Fellowship. Here, because Autonomous Region is not the settlor, its first theory failed.Second, the “special interest” standing doctrine does not extend to revocable trusts because the settlors of those trusts have elected to retain the power of revocation and hence the oversight this doctrine aims to supply.   Finally, Autonomous Region contends it should have been allowed to add facts supporting its interpretation that the trust confers standing on any regional delegate group. However, the court t held that the lower court’s s interpretation of the trust was correct. View "Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs" on Justia Law

McDonald sought letters of administration for the estate of his deceased brother, John. An affidavit averred that John’s only heirs were his parents and his siblings. McDonald had been appointed plenary guardian over John’s person and estate; thereafter, without the prior knowledge of his guardian or the court, John participated in a purported wedding ceremony with Ellizzette. The circuit court entered orders appointing Shawn as administrator and declaring John’s heirs to be John’s parents and siblings. McDonald filed but then withdrew a petition for declaration of invalidity of marriage, and filed a petition to recover assets. The court allowed Ellizzette to file a petition seeking letters of administration based on her assertion that she is John’s surviving spouse, then held that Ellizzette failed to present a prima facie case establishing the validity of the marriage. The Appellate Court remanded, finding the circuit court erred in barring Ellizzette from testifying based on the Dead Man’s Act. 735 ILCS 5/8-201.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. Under the Probate Act, a ward who wishes to enter into a marriage may do so only with the consent of his guardian. Ellizzette was aware at the time of the marriage that John was under guardianship, so the marriage might not be valid. No best interest finding was ever sought or made. Ellizzette could not have provided any testimony that would have been sufficient to prove the validity of the marriage and could not have been prejudiced by her inability to testify regarding the marriage. View "In re Estate of McDonald" on Justia Law

A church entity became the legal or beneficial owner of certain real and personal property after The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina (Disassociated Diocese) and thirty-six individual Episcopal Parishes (Parishes) disassociated from The Episcopal Church in the United States of America (National Church). The dispute presented two broad questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court: (1) who owned the real estate long-owned and occupied by the individual Parishes; and (2) who was the beneficiary of a statutorily-created trust controlled by the Trustees of The Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Trustees). The National Church and the Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Associated Diocese) contended the South Carolina Supreme Court made a final decision as to who owned all the disputed property when the Court heard the case in 2015 and each Justice sitting on the Court in 2015 issued a separate opinion in 2017. The Parishes disagreed the Court made a final decision as to the real property occupied by twenty-nine Parishes, and contended the Court left much to be decided by the circuit court as to these Parishes. The Disassociated Diocese and the Trustees agreed the Supreme Court made a final decision as to real and personal property the Trustees formerly held in trust for the Lower Diocese—the second question—but they disagree what that decision was. To the second question presented, the Supreme Court agreed with the National Church and the Associated Diocese that the 2017 Court decided the real and personal property held in trust by the Trustees was held for the benefit of the Associated Diocese. As to the first question, the Supreme Court determined the 2017 Court did not make a final decision as to the real property owned by the twenty-nine Parishes. As to some Parishes, the Court held the circuit court correctly ruled the individual Parish retained ownership of its property. As to other Parishes, those Parishes created an irrevocable trust in favor of the National Church and its diocese, now the Associated Diocese. As to the Parishes that created a trust, the Court directed that appropriate documentation be filed in the public record indicating the National Church and the Associated Diocese now owned that real estate. From its decision here, there will be no remand. "The case is over." View "The Protestant Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Church" on Justia Law