Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Mutual sold fractional investment interests in viatical settlements in which a terminally ill insured sold his life insurance policy to a third party for a lump-sum cash payment--a percentage of the policy’s face value. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Mutual for falsely representing that its life expectancy figures, “of paramount importance” for valuing the settlements, had been produced by independent physicians. The Mutual policies were put into receivership; investors were given the option of retaining their investments or directing the receiver to sell. Some of the "Keep" investors did not pay their share of premiums, leaving the policies at risk of lapse and the non-defaulting investors at risk of losing their investments. Acheron purchased fractional interests of defaulting investors from the receiver.In 2009, the district court approved the transfer and management of the Keep Policies—including some policies in which Acheron held fractional interests—from the receiver to a trustee. The trustee obtained court approval to sell the policies in the trust, including those in which Acheron held an interest. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Acheron’s appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The order is not a final decision, 28 U.S.C. 1291, and did not involve the refusal to wind up a receivership, section 1292(a)(2). View "Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal" on Justia Law

Clark Beach appealed a district court order denying his petition for formal probate of a holographic will. Clark was the brother of Skip Beach (“decedent”). The decedent lived in Golden Valley County, North Dakota. He was survived by seven siblings and one daughter. The will at issue was submitted to informal probate, and co-personal representatives were appointed. Clark filed a petition for formal probate of the will. The purported holographic will left everything the decedent owned to Clark. The court entered its order denying the petition for formal probate of the holographic will. The court found the signature “Skip Beach” on the proposed holographic will was the decedent’s signature based on the evidence. The court held the clause “Everything I own” was a material portion and was not in the decedent’s handwriting. The court reasoned that the clause appeared to have been written in different ink, was lighter in appearance, and was slanted different than the rest of the document. Additionally, the court found the clause was smaller in text and was written in only printed letters while other portions of the document use a mix of cursive and printed letters. The court stated the testimony given by Clark Beach, his siblings, and others did not change the court’s finding and stated “[n]one of these individuals are handwriting experts, and none of them ever saw this purported will before Skip’s death.” The court held that Clark Beach failed to meet his burden of proof that a material portion of the document was in the testator’s handwriting as required by law. Clark argued the district court erred in finding the material portions of the holographic will were not in the testator’s handwriting. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the petition for formal probate. View "Estate of Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants for breach of an agreement, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens.Plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, and his sister, a resident of California, were beneficiaries of separate trusts (the BRT and the MRT). The Trustees that managed the BRT and MRT resided in or had offices in California. The BRT and MRT were each fifty percent members of a California entity that owned property in Wyoming. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted that his sister and the Trustees breached their agreement to sell the MRT's interest in the California entity to BRT. The district court dismissed the complaint based on forum non conveniens and its conclusion that the parties had a separate settlement agreement requiring litigation to be brought in a California probate court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing on the basis of forum non conveniens. View "Lund v. Lund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the superior court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims alleging undue influence in this trusts and estates case, holding that Plaintiffs' claims for intentional interference and unjust enrichment were not time barred.After learning that they had been removed as beneficiaries of their grandfather's trust, Plaintiffs brought suit against their aunts and their grandmother's estate, arguing that their exclusion from the trust arose from undue influence. The superior court dismissed the action, concluding that the claims were time barred under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 203E, 604, which establishes a one-year deadline after the trust settlor's death for actions contesting the validity of a trust. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that their claims did not challenge the validity of the trust and were therefore not time barred. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were substantively different from the trust contests governed by section 604 and were therefore not time barred. View "Sacks v. Dissinger" on Justia Law

Scott Smith and Kristen Hackmann, co-personal representatives of William Smith’s estate, appealed a February 17, 2021 order denying their post-judgment motions and granting Charlene and LeeAllen Smith’s motion to enforce the existing judgment. On June 15, 2020, the co-personal representatives filed an amended inventory and appraisement along with a notice of proposed distribution. Charlene Smith objected to the proposed distribution and filed a motion to compel compliance with the November 2, 2018 Judgment. In response to the motion to compel, the co-personal representatives argued that Charlene Smith had rejected the distribution reflected in the November 2, 2018 Judgment by filing for an elective share, she had no probable cause to challenge the will so the penalty clause in the will had been triggered, and the question of whether she was entitled to a share of the estate remained open. Charlene Smith’s assertion of an elective share and challenge to the will were within the litigation between the parties prior to the entry of the 2018 Judgment. A hearing was held on October 13, 2020. Charlene Smith argued that the 2018 Judgment was final regardless of a provision that left open an increase in legal and administrative fees. The co-personal representatives argued there were mistakes in the 2018 inventory and appraisement and questioned whether the district court should require distributions pursuant to the 2018 Judgment, the supplemental inventory, or start over. During the hearing, all of the parties provided argument on the issue of whether the 2018 Judgment was final. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted: “These matters—or the Motion to Compel issue, obviously, needs to be decided first.” The court found the 2018 Judgment was final, the time to appeal the November 2, 2018 Judgment had passed, LeeAllen and Charlene Smith were entitled to their distributions pursuant to the 2018 Judgment, and the finality of the 2018 Judgment precluded resolution of the co-personal representatives’ post-judgment motions. The court ordered attorney’s fees to be paid by the co-personal representatives personally after finding there was no basis in law to support their post-judgment motions and their authority as personal representatives had ceased. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred the 2018 Judgment was final, thereby affirming the February 2021 order. View "Estate of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court that instructed a receiver to continue its management of agricultural land, in which Appellants, the testator's children, each held fractional life estates along with the testator's surviving spouse, holding that it was too late to attack the receiver's appointment.In 2019, the court appointed a receiver. In 2021, the court provided further instructions to the receiver. Appellants appealed, arguing that the district court appointed a receiver for 2021 without either party requesting the appointment and without deciding that a receiver was needed or necessary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the receiver was appointed in 2019, not 2021, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its instructions to the receiver. View "Seid v. Seid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' motion to set aside an order probating their father's will and appointing their stepmother, Appellee, as personal representative of their father's estate, holding that sufficient evidence supported the circuit court's decision.In Appellants' motion, Appellants also contested the validity of their father's will and alleged that Appellee unduly influenced their father to dilute Appellants' share of an annuity, payable upon his death. The circuit court determined that the will was valid and that there was no undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the circuit court's conclusions. View "Haverstick v. Haverstick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Awana Ring was approximately 80 years old when her daughter Vickie Atiyeh died in November 2015. In her will, Atiyeh left a house to Ring. Roy Scott Robb (Scott Robb) and Zachary Robb were a son and an adult grandson of Ring, and father and son to one another. The Robbs were both named as defendants in this action, but were not party to this appeal. Defendants-respondents here were Richard Harmon and the corporation TSG Financial Corp. (TSG); Ring alleged that TSG was Harmon's alter ego. According to Ring, the Robbs, working together with respondents, used probate proceedings as a means to extract equity from the house to use for their own purposes. Scott Robb, in particular, in accordance with a plan designed through discussions with Harmon, caused a probate proceeding to be initiated regarding Atiyeh’s estate, orchestrated Ring’s appointment as personal representative of the estate, and then had Ring use that authority to enter into a loan to the estate secured by the house, with respondents serving as broker and lender. In addition to the loan having predatory terms, some of the loan funds were used to pay fees to respondents, and some were disbursed to an estate account, but then withdrawn by the Robbs for their own purposes. The Court of Appeal addressed whether a person who was both personal representative of a probate estate and a beneficiary of that estate, could maintain in her individual capacity, a claim for financial elder abuse (or any other claims) based on allegations that she was manipulated into taking actions as personal representative that damaged her interests as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled that she could not, sustaining the respondents’ demurrer on the view that the claims had to be brought in the person’s capacity as the personal representative. The Court of Appeal found plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim was adequately pleaded, therefore, reversing the trial court's judgment. View "Ring v. Harmon" on Justia Law

Robert Johnson and Beverly Edwin were married for twenty-two years, and together had three children. During their marriage, Johnson signed and recorded an “Affidavit of Usufruct” in favor of Edwin “for the remainder of [Ms. Edwin’s] life even if she remarries.” This lifetime usufruct covered Johnson’s separate property in Walker, Louisiana. During their marriage, Johnson and Edwin lived in a house on the subject property and also rebuilt the house together following a fire. The couple separated in 2002 or 2003, at which time Edwin moved off of the premises, while Johnson continued to live there. The couple divorced in 2006. Johnson died intestate on August 13, 2010. In June 2014, Edwin petitioned to be named administratrix of Johnson’s succession and was initially appointed as such. However, the trial court removed her as administratrix and appointed three of Johnson’s fourteen children to serve as co-administrators, namely: Lorie Parker, Aveis Parker, and Robert Johnson, Jr. In 2018, after a family conflict arose regarding who had a right to use the property, Edwin filed a “Motion to Enforce Conventional Usufruct and Spousal Reimbursement Claim,” contending the house on the property was vacant, the value of the property was depreciating, and it needed repair. Edwin further alleged Johnson’s estate owed her $21,600.00, representing the amount of money she claimed to have expended to clean, maintain, and improve the property due to the alleged neglect of the co-administrators. The co-administrators countered, filing a peremptory exception of prescription in which they argued that Edwin’s usufruct was extinguished by the ten-year prescription of nonuse. In opposition to the exception, Edwin contended that the prescription of nonuse did not apply to a lifetime usufruct. Alternatively, she asserted that she had used the property during the pertinent ten-year period so as to interrupt the accrual of prescription for nonuse. Certiorari was granted in this matter to determine whether a usufruct “granted for life” was subject to the ten-year prescription of nonuse set forth in La. C.C. art. 621; and, if so, whether the lifetime usufruct established in this case was prescribed pursuant to that article. After review of the record and consideration of the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that while a lifetime usufruct may prescribe due to nonuse, the usufruct at issue did not prescribe as there was no ten-year period of continued nonuse. The lower courts’ judgments were reversed. View "In re: Succession of the Estate of Robert Johnson" on Justia Law

Ilka Porter and Lina Louise Porter, through her mother and next friend, Ilka Porter, appealed a probate court order that concluded Sean Porter was married to Alexis Campbell Porter at the time of his death, and appointing Alexis Campbell Porter as administratrix of his estate. The question presented by these appeals was one of first impression in Alabama: Whether the death of a party to a marriage, after a marriage document is executed but before the marriage document is recorded, invalidates the marriage for failure to comply with the registration requirements of section 22-9A-17, Ala. Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that it did not, affirming the probate court's order. View "Porter v. Estate of Porter" on Justia Law