Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Buford and Sharon Combs executed a joint will in 2013, intending to distribute their estate equally among their five children from previous marriages. Buford died in October 2020, and Sharon died in January 2021. Most of their assets were held jointly with right of survivorship, and Buford's estate was small enough to dispense with administration. Sharon's sons were initially appointed as co-administrators, but Greg Combs later filed a motion to probate the joint will as a lost will, which was granted by the Jackson District Court.The Napier brothers filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the joint will's provisions only took effect if Buford and Sharon died in a common disaster or close in time, which did not occur. They claimed Sharon died intestate, entitling them to inherit all property. The Combs siblings argued the couple intended to divide the estate equally among all five children and sought to reform the will to remove the qualifying clause.The Jackson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Combs siblings, interpreting the will to distribute the estate equally among the children. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the will was unambiguous and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible. They concluded Sharon died intestate as the conditions in the will were not met.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the presumption against intestacy and the impracticality of administering separate estates supported the interpretation that the estate should be divided equally among the five children. The court reinstated the Jackson Circuit Court's summary judgment. View "COMBS V. NAPIER" on Justia Law

The respondent, Justin Nadeau (husband), appealed the final decree of divorce from the petitioner, Michelle Nadeau (wife), issued by the Circuit Court. The husband argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate and denying his request for alimony. Additionally, the husband and his parents, James and Gail Nadeau, contended that the trial court erred in adding the parents to the action for discovery purposes only.The Circuit Court found that the parties had a wedding ceremony in June 2009, but the officiant's license had lapsed, leading to a second civil ceremony in July 2009. Before the June ceremony, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement. The husband owned properties in Rye and Portsmouth, which were transferred to a trust managed by his father before the second ceremony. The wife discovered these transfers in 2012 during an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. The Rye property was sold in 2013 or 2014, and the State Street property was sold during the divorce proceedings. The wife filed for divorce in May 2020, and the trial court joined the husband’s parents for discovery purposes due to the husband's non-compliance with discovery orders.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not err in treating the State Street and Rye properties as part of the marital estate, as the transfers were likely fraudulent and diminished the marital estate's value. The court also found that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding the wife the proceeds from her personal injury settlement. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to join the husband’s parents for discovery purposes did not affect the outcome of the case, as the adverse inferences were drawn from the husband's own actions. View "In the Matter of Nadeau & Nadeau" on Justia Law

Jill Brenden appealed an order from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which denied her claims against the estate of her late husband, Robert Brenden. Jill sought reimbursement for expenses and objected to the distribution and valuation of certain property in the estate. Barbara Jensen, Robert's sister and the appellee, sought attorney fees. Jill and Robert had a long-term relationship, cohabitated, and married in 2010. They purchased a home together in 2006 and later built another home on a property Robert inherited. Robert was diagnosed with cancer, which went into remission but later returned. Before his death, Robert designated Barbara as the Payable on Death (POD) beneficiary of his bank account.The District Court found that Jill converted funds from Robert's account after his death, despite her claim that Robert instructed her to transfer the funds before he died. The court admitted bank records as business records, which showed the transfers occurred after Robert's death. Jill continued to access the account and transferred funds to herself without notifying the estate. Barbara intervened in the probate action, filing a third-party complaint against Jill for wrongful conversion and deceit. Jill counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment and seeking a constructive trust over the proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the bank records as business records. The court affirmed the District Court's finding that Jill converted the funds in Robert's account, as Barbara became the rightful owner upon Robert's death. However, the court found that Jill was entitled to her share of the proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home, held in a resulting trust. The court denied Barbara's request for attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Estate of Brenden" on Justia Law

In 2008, John Wallace Frabbiele executed a three-page document as his last will and testament, bequeathing his estate to his third wife, Barbara Ann Nash Frabbiele, and his son Anthony. The will was signed before two witnesses and a notary public. John died in 2021, and Barbara filed the will for probate. John’s seven adult children opposed the probate, arguing the will was invalid because John only initialed the first two pages and signed his name on the last page.The 40th Judicial District Court found the will valid, ruling that John’s initials on the first two pages substantially complied with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577(1). The appellate court denied a writ application, agreeing with the trial court’s decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the initials satisfied the mandatory signature requirements of Article 1577(1). The court held that the testator’s initials on the first two pages did not meet the requirement to “sign his name” on each page. The court emphasized that the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, requiring a full signature on each page to prevent fraud. The court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, declaring the will invalid due to noncompliance with the mandatory formalities of Article 1577(1). View "Succession of Frabbiele" on Justia Law

Allison J. Littlefield filed a verified petition against Scott Littlefield, David Littlefield, and Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust and its sub-trusts. The petition alleged misuse of Trust funds, concealment of information, conversion of Allison’s personal property, wrongful removal of Allison from the board, and imposition of restrictions on her and her husband’s use of the Ranch. Allison sought removal of the co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the Trust, and declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order enjoining the co-trustees from harassing, disparaging, or defaming her.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the co-trustees' special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the co-trustees failed to show that Allison’s petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison’s request for attorney’s fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the co-trustees did not meet their burden of showing that the petition arose from protected activity. The court found that the co-trustees’ motion was overreaching and did not identify specific allegations of protected activity. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Allison’s request for attorney’s fees, determining that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because no reasonable attorney would conclude that the motion had merit. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney’s fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Chapter Kris Jackson, the debtor, appeals the bankruptcy court’s order denying her motion for sanctions, damages, and other relief against Rachel Gosset and Jordan Beswick, co-trustees of the Jackson Family Trust. Jackson sought an evidentiary hearing on these issues, an order requiring the co-trustees to post a bond, an order barring them from filing any involuntary bankruptcy petition without court approval, and a declaration that the case is void ab initio.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri initially held a status hearing and decided to bifurcate Jackson’s motion to dismiss from her other motions. The court dismissed the involuntary petition under 11 U.S.C. § 305 but denied Jackson’s requests for sanctions and damages, citing minimal potential damages, lack of authority to award damages under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) when dismissing under § 305, and Jackson’s litigation tactics.The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The panel noted that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC clarified that damages under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) are available even when a case is dismissed under § 305. The panel found that the bankruptcy court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow Jackson to present evidence supporting her claims for damages and other relief. The panel remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for such a hearing.The panel also denied Jackson’s various motions, including her motion to strike the appellees' brief and her motion for sanctions, as they were outside the scope of the appeal. The panel emphasized that its role was to review the bankruptcy court’s decisions, not to make initial determinations on issues the bankruptcy court abstained from deciding. View "Jackson v. Gosset" on Justia Law

Ginger Collins, acting on behalf of her mother Jean Mace, sought to invalidate the sale of Jean’s home, which was sold by her sister Judy Mace without Ginger’s knowledge. Jean and her husband had transferred the property to Judy, who lived with them and acted as their caretaker. After Jean was moved to an assisted living facility and Judy was diagnosed with cancer, Judy created a revocable trust and transferred the property to it. Shortly before her death, Judy sold the property to Deborah and Raymond Luther. Ginger, believing the property was held in trust for Jean’s benefit, filed suit to evict the Luthers and invalidate the sale.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Boundary County, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Scott Mace (Judy’s cousin and trustee) and the Luthers, dismissing Ginger’s resulting trust claim. The court ruled that the deed transferring the property to Judy was unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to establish a resulting trust. Ginger’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the court also denied Scott Mace’s request for attorney fees under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA).The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence to support Ginger’s resulting trust claim. The court emphasized that extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish a resulting trust, as it can reveal the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the grant of partial summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court declined to address the public policy argument and denied attorney fees on appeal for both parties. View "Mace v. Luther" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the Sussex County Division of Social Services, Office of Adult Protective Services (APS), filed a complaint seeking a plenary guardianship for "Hank," an alleged incapacitated person. Steven J. Kossup was appointed as Hank's attorney, and Brian C. Lundquist was appointed as his temporary guardian. They ensured Hank had stable housing, financial assistance, and medical care. Despite APS's recommendation for a plenary guardian, Kossup and Lundquist argued for a limited guardianship based on Hank's improved circumstances and an expert psychologist's report.The trial court denied the fee applications submitted by Kossup and Lundquist, who sought compensation for their services from APS. The court found no basis for such awards in the Adult Protective Services Act (APS Act) or Rule 4:86-4(e). The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that the APS Act and relevant statutes only authorize fee awards from the estate of the alleged incapacitated person, not from APS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that there is no support in the governing statutes, court rules, or case law for fee awards against APS. The American Rule, which requires litigants to bear their own legal costs, applies, and exceptions in Rule 4:42-9(a) and Rule 4:86-4(e) do not authorize fee awards against APS. The Court emphasized the importance of pro bono service in guardianship matters and suggested that attorneys should be informed if they are expected to serve pro bono. The Court also acknowledged the significant contributions of Kossup and Lundquist in securing necessary services for Hank. View "In re A.D." on Justia Law

The decedent, Marc F. Thurrell, executed a will in 1997, leaving his estate to his father and, if his father predeceased him, to his uncle. Both the father and the uncle died before the decedent. At the time of the decedent's death, the uncle's children and the decedent's sister (the respondent) were alive. The respondent argued that the estate should pass to her under New Hampshire's anti-lapse statute, RSA 551:12, as the sole surviving lineal descendant of the father, or alternatively, through intestacy.The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) granted a petition for estate administration, listing the uncle's children as beneficiaries and appointing the petitioner as executor. The respondent objected, arguing that the estate should pass to her under the anti-lapse statute or through intestacy. The trial court ruled that the bequest to the father lapsed due to a survivorship requirement, but the bequest to the uncle did not lapse, applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the estate to the uncle's children. The respondent's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion to determine heirs were denied.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the decedent's will did not express an intention for the will to lapse or for the anti-lapse statute to be inapplicable to the uncle's bequest. The will's language indicated that the decedent intended for the anti-lapse statute to apply to the uncle's bequest, allowing the uncle's children to inherit. The court also found that the intentional omission clause in the will did not preclude the uncle's children from inheriting, as they were provided for in the will through the anti-lapse statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying RSA 551:12 to the residual bequest to the uncle and properly denied the respondent's motion to determine heirs. View "In re Estate of Thurrell" on Justia Law

Mable Hrynchuk named Bryan Kenton as the sole beneficiary of her estate, which included her residential property. After her death, the homeowner’s association foreclosed on the property and sold it to Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills. Kenton, through his attorney-in-fact, Foreclosure Recovery Services, sought to redeem the property as a successor in interest. Saticoy Bay refused, asserting that Kenton was not the successor in interest and had no rights of redemption under Nevada law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of Foreclosure Recovery Services, holding that Kenton was the successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. Saticoy Bay appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that a will beneficiary is immediately vested with a beneficial interest in devised property upon the testator’s death and is therefore the testator’s successor in interest for the purposes of NRS 116.31166. The court concluded that Kenton, as the sole beneficiary of Hrynchuk’s will, was her successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. The court also determined that Foreclosure Recovery Services provided all necessary documentation to Saticoy Bay to establish its right to act on behalf of Kenton in redeeming the property. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills v. Foreclosure Recovery Services, LLC" on Justia Law