Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Randall Moe executed a Last Will and Testament in 1989, shortly after ending a relationship with Cynthia Almer. The will included provisions to bequeath all his property to Almer, with a contingent bequest to his daughter, Amanda Miller, if Almer predeceased him. Moe also designated Almer as the guardian for Miller and the personal representative of his estate. Moe passed away in July 2022, and Miller was appointed as the personal representative of his estate. Almer later filed a petition for formal probate and to set aside Miller’s appointment, while Miller sought to reform the will to reflect Moe’s intent to pass his estate to her.The District Court of Williams County held a bench trial and found the will valid and enforceable but concluded it was affected by a mistake of law or fact. The court reformed the will to state that Almer would hold Moe’s property in trust for Miller if she was a minor at the time of his death, otherwise, the property would go to Miller outright. The court also appointed Miller as the personal representative of the estate.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its findings. The Supreme Court concluded that the will was not inconsistent and that the extrinsic evidence considered by the district court did not relate to Moe’s intent at the time he executed the will. The Supreme Court held that the district court misapplied the law by considering post-execution evidence unrelated to Moe’s intent when he executed the will. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment reforming Moe’s will. View "Estate of Moe" on Justia Law

The case involves the administration of the Charles and Patricia Masek Family Trust. Barry Masek, a contingent beneficiary and successor cotrustee, alleged that his siblings, Mark Masek and Dianne Yahiro, also contingent beneficiaries and successor cotrustees, breached the trust. Barry claimed that Mark and Dianne blocked access to their mother, Patricia Masek, the settlor, beneficiary, and trustee, and misused trust assets for their benefit. Patricia later died, and the county court entered a money judgment against Mark and Dianne in favor of Barry and overruled their motion for a new trial.Mark and Dianne appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the county court's decision because it did not state the legal basis for finding Mark and Dianne liable for breach of trust. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine their liability either as de facto trustees or by participating in a breach of trust committed by Patricia.On remand, the county court received additional evidence and determined that Mark and Dianne were liable to the trust by participating in or inducing Patricia to commit breaches of trust while she was in their care. The court issued a judgment against Mark and Dianne for $1,276,858, which included various expenditures from the trust assets. Mark and Dianne appealed again, and Barry cross-appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that competent evidence supported the county court's findings for some, but not all, of the disputed expenditures. The court modified the judgment to $619,000, affirming it in favor of Barry in his capacity as cotrustee of the Charles and Patricia Masek Family Trust. The court also upheld the award of additional attorney fees to Barry. View "In re Masek Family Trust" on Justia Law

Chester “Chet” Lake contested the probate of his mother’s will, which his sister Mary Chesnutt had filed. Lake doubted the will’s validity, claiming undue influence, and requested a jury trial to determine the issue of devisavit vel non. The Madison County Chancery Court entered a scheduling order but did not specify whether the trial would be a bench or jury trial. After the discovery and motions deadlines passed, Lake filed a Notice of Jury Trial. Chesnutt moved to strike the notice, arguing that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by participating in pretrial proceedings and that the notice was untimely.The Madison County Chancery Court granted Chesnutt’s motion to strike, finding that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by agreeing to the scheduling order and that his notice was untimely. Lake appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that Lake had not waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-19, Lake was entitled to a jury trial upon request before any hearing on the issue of devisavit vel non. The court determined that the entry of the scheduling order did not constitute a hearing on the matter and that Lake’s notice, filed thirty-two days before the trial date, was timely. The court reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Lake v. Chesnutt" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a 1944 deed that placed a 330-acre parcel of land, known as Camp Bomazeen, in a charitable trust for use by the Boy Scouts of America for camping. Pine Tree Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America (Pine Tree) appealed a summary judgment from the Superior Court (Kennebec County) against it on the Attorney General’s complaint for breach of trust and on Pine Tree’s counterclaims for declaratory judgment regarding its property rights in the land. Intervenors Bruce F. Rueger and Scott F. Adams, representing the Bomazeen Old Timers, cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in entering summary judgment against them on their claims against Pine Tree for breach of fiduciary duties and their request for the court to apply the cy pres doctrine.The Superior Court found in favor of the Attorney General, concluding that Pine Tree had only legal title to the property and not equitable title. The court determined that Pine Tree could sell Camp Bomazeen but must use the proceeds to support camping activities for Boy Scouts in central Maine, consistent with the trust’s purposes. The court also ruled against Pine Tree on its counterclaims and against the Old Timers on their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. It held that Pine Tree succeeded only to legal title of the property and not to equitable title, meaning the trust did not terminate. The court also held that the proceeds from any sale of Camp Bomazeen must be used for the trust’s original purposes. The court found no basis for applying the cy pres doctrine, as the trust’s purposes could still be achieved. The judgment against Pine Tree and the Old Timers was affirmed. View "Attorney General v. Pine Tree Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law

Thomas Reich created a revocable trust in 2003, which was later amended in 2016. The trust provided specific cash gifts to his ex-wife, brother, and nephew, and the residue to his daughter Shannon or granddaughter Leah if Shannon predeceased him. Thomas also maintained an IRA, designating Shannon's and Leah's separate trusts as beneficiaries. Thomas married Pamela Reich in 2020 and died in 2021 without updating his trust to include her. Pamela sought an omitted spouse's share of Thomas's estate, including the IRA proceeds.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially overruled a demurrer by Shannon, ruling that IRA proceeds could sometimes be included in a decedent's estate. However, after a partial settlement excluding the IRA proceeds, Pamela filed new petitions regarding her entitlement to the IRA proceeds. The probate court dismissed these petitions, reasoning that the IRA proceeds were nonprobate assets and did not pass through Thomas's trust.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the IRA proceeds were not part of Thomas's estate for calculating Pamela's omitted spouse's share because IRAs are nonprobate assets. The court noted that the IRA proceeds were designated to pass directly to the separate trusts for Shannon and Leah, not through Thomas's trust. The court affirmed the probate court's orders, concluding that the IRA proceeds were correctly excluded from Pamela's omitted spouse's share. View "Reich v. Reich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the Carolyn Patricia Young Family Trust, alleged that the defendants, the trust protector and trustee, were conspiring to withhold trust funds improperly. The alleged conspiracy aimed to preserve assets for the trustee, who is also a residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff sought an ex parte application to suspend the defendants' powers and appoint an interim trustee.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the ex parte application, issuing a minute order that suspended the powers of the trustee and trust protector, appointed a private professional fiduciary as interim trustee, required the interim trustee to post a bond, set a review hearing, and prohibited the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization. Defendants appealed this order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that orders suspending trustees and appointing interim trustees in probate court are not directly appealable. The court emphasized that such orders are provisional remedies, not final orders, and thus do not fall under the categories of appealable orders listed in the Probate Code sections 1300 and 1304. The court also found that the defendants lacked standing to appeal the portions of the order imposing a bond requirement and prohibiting the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization, as these did not injuriously affect the defendants' rights or interests in an immediate and substantial way.The court dismissed the appeal and denied the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, although it expressed concern over the conduct of the defendants' counsel. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' first request for judicial notice, granted the plaintiff's request for judicial notice, and denied the defendants' second request for judicial notice. View "Young v. Hartford" on Justia Law

Dr. Laura Dean Head passed away in 2013, leaving behind her sisters, Della Hamlin and Helaine Head. Shortly before her death, Dr. Head executed a trust naming her former student and friend, Zakiya Jendayi, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. In 2020, Hamlin and Head petitioned the probate court to invalidate the trust, alleging undue influence, lack of capacity, and forgery. After a 17-day bench trial, the court found that Jendayi had exerted undue influence over Dr. Head and invalidated the trust.The Alameda County Superior Court held a bench trial and found that the trust was presumptively the product of undue influence. The court shifted the burden to Jendayi to disprove undue influence, which she failed to do. The court found that Dr. Head was vulnerable and dependent on Jendayi, who used her position to unduly benefit from the trust. The court invalidated the trust and ordered the assets transferred to the special administrator of Dr. Head’s estate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that Hamlin and Head, as potential intestate heirs, had standing to contest the trust. The court found substantial evidence supporting the probate court’s application of the presumption of undue influence and its finding that Jendayi unduly influenced Dr. Head. The court also rejected Jendayi’s claims of judicial bias and found no deficiencies in the probate court’s statement of decision that warranted reversal. The appellate court concluded that the probate court did not err in its findings and affirmed the judgment. View "Hamlin v. Jendayi" on Justia Law

Silvia Villareal created a revocable living trust in 2005, which she amended in 2018 and again in 2019. The trust named her three children, Leticia Linzer, Arturo Villareal, and Sonia Godoy, as beneficiaries, each to receive a one-third interest in her home. The 2018 amendment suggested, but did not mandate, that the property be kept within the family. The 2019 amendment, however, imposed mandatory conditions that any sale of the property be limited to $100,000 and only to the siblings, with flexible payment terms.After Silvia's death in 2020, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the Los Angeles County Superior Court to determine whether the 2019 amendment's conditions were mandatory and, if so, to declare them void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation under California Civil Code section 711. The probate court found the conditions mandatory and void, ruling that they unreasonably restricted the siblings' ability to sell their interests at fair market value. The court declared the 2019 amendment void and upheld the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court's decision, holding that section 711 applies to testamentary instruments and prohibits unreasonable restraints on alienation. The court found that the 2019 amendment's conditions were indeed an unreasonable restraint, as they significantly devalued the property and limited the market to only two potential buyers. The court also rejected Leticia's argument that the 2019 amendment created a new testamentary trust, finding no clear intent or adherence to the procedures for establishing a separate trust. Thus, the 2018 restatement remained the operative trust document. View "Godoy v. Linzner" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust, specifically Allison Littlefield, her brothers David and Scott Littlefield, and her aunt Denise Sobel. Allison filed a petition alleging various grievances, including the removal of co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the Trust. She claimed that the co-trustees misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, and restricted her and her husband's use of the Ranch. Additionally, she alleged that the co-trustees failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who had been hostile towards her and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to prevent lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights. The court found that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, concluding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the petition was based on protected activity. However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees. The appellate court found that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because it was entirely without merit, as no reasonable attorney would conclude that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Lucy Mancini Newell was designated as the trustee and sole beneficiary of her parents' trust. After her father, Arthur Mancini, passed away, Newell discovered that he had amended the trust to name his caregiver, Neneth Rollins, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. Newell challenged the validity of these amendments and, upon learning that Rollins used trust assets to purchase real property, recorded a lis pendens against the property and sought to impose a constructive trust on it.The probate court granted Rollins' motion to expunge the lis pendens, ruling that Newell's petition did not contain a "real property claim" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court concluded that Newell's petition sought to invalidate the trust amendments and change the trustee, but did not directly affect the title or possession of the real property.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Newell's petition did indeed contain a real property claim because it would affect the title to the property if successful. The court noted that the trustee holds legal title to the trust's property, and a change in trustee would change the name on the title. Therefore, the petition would affect the title to the Van Nuys property.The Court of Appeal granted Newell's petition for writ of mandate, directing the probate court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens and to enter a new order denying Rollins' motion to expunge. The court also awarded Newell her costs in the proceeding. View "Newell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law