Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A resident of a memory-care facility in Massachusetts alleged that the facility’s court-appointed receiver, KCP Advisory Group, LLC, conspired with others to unlawfully evict residents, including herself, by falsely claiming that the local fire department had ordered an emergency evacuation. The resident, after being transferred to another facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting several state-law claims against KCP and other defendants. The complaint alleged that KCP’s actions violated statutory and contractual notice requirements and were carried out in bad faith.KCP moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that as a court-appointed receiver, it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that while quasi-judicial immunity barred claims based on negligent performance of receivership duties, it did not bar claims alleging that KCP acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law and contract, or in bad faith. The court thus denied KCP’s motion to dismiss several counts, including those for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. KCP appealed the denial of immunity as to these counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of absolute quasi-judicial immunity de novo. The appellate court held that KCP’s alleged acts—removing residents from the facility—were judicial in nature and within the scope of its authority as receiver. Because KCP did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, the court concluded that quasi-judicial immunity barred all of the resident’s claims against KCP. The First Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss the specified counts. View "Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Two children of a decedent alleged that their late stepmother wrongfully transferred assets belonging to their father to herself, depriving them of property they would have received under his will. The assets in question included a house and shares in a corporation. The stepmother, who had married their father after both had children from previous marriages, allegedly used a power of attorney to transfer the property to herself during the father’s cognitive decline. After both the father and stepmother died, the children claimed they were not notified of the stepmother’s estate proceedings and that the disputed property was distributed to the stepmother’s descendants.The District Court for Lincoln County dismissed the children’s complaint, citing the doctrine of jurisdictional priority because a similar proceeding was pending in county court. After the county court dismissed the children’s petition for lack of standing, the district court denied the children’s motion to alter or amend its dismissal, without further explanation. The children appealed, arguing that the district court’s reliance on jurisdictional priority was no longer justified after the county court’s dismissal.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the children had standing to pursue relief under the Nebraska Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which specifically allows a principal’s issue to petition a court to review an agent’s conduct under a power of attorney. The court found that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority no longer applied once the county court proceeding was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court also determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the children would not have inherited the disputed property under the will or by operation of law, even if the transfers were invalid. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the children should be given leave to amend their complaint and reversed and remanded the case with directions to allow amendment. View "Kimball v. Rosedale Ranch" on Justia Law

In 1997, an individual applied to the Utah Division of Water Rights to divert water from a surface source in the Weber Basin for irrigation and livestock purposes. The application was met with protests from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, among others. After a hearing in 1998 and sporadic communications over the next two decades, the Utah State Engineer ultimately denied the application in 2018. The applicant sought judicial review in the Second District Court, arguing that the denial was improper because the water source contained unappropriated water, the application would not interfere with existing rights, and the application’s 1997 filing date should give it priority.While the case was pending in the Second District Court, the applicant died. His counsel moved to substitute the estate’s personal representative as the plaintiff under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion, holding that the claim did not survive the applicant’s death because he had no perfected property right and any inchoate right was not mentioned in his will. The court also found that Utah’s general survival statute did not apply, and dismissed the case. The estate appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether the district court erred in denying substitution and dismissing the claim. The court held that the burden was on the movant to show the claim survived death. It found that neither common law nor statute provided for the survival of a claim for judicial review of an administrative denial of a water appropriation application. The court concluded that the claim abated upon the applicant’s death and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Marriott v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

An individual diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease was admitted to a personal care facility in Kentucky after his spouse, who had been appointed his conservator by a Tennessee court, signed a mandatory arbitration agreement required for admission. The spouse did not specify her capacity when signing. The patient later suffered injuries and died, leading his spouse, as administratrix of his estate, to file suit alleging negligence, wrongful death, and other claims against the facility and its operators.The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the spouse had authority to sign the agreement under the Tennessee conservatorship order or, alternatively, under Kentucky’s Living Will Directive Act, which allows a spouse to make “health care decisions” for an incapacitated person. The Fayette Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that signing an arbitration agreement was not a health care decision under the Act and that the spouse lacked authority to bind the patient. The court did not rule on unconscionability. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, distinguishing prior cases involving powers of attorney and holding that the Act’s definition of “health care decision” did not include entering arbitration agreements.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether a spouse may bind an incapacitated person to arbitration for facility admission under the Living Will Directive Act. The Court held that signing an arbitration agreement is not a “health care decision” as defined by Kentucky law, which limits such decisions to consenting to or withdrawing consent for medical procedures, treatments, or interventions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the denial of the motion to compel arbitration, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LEXINGTON ALZHEIMER'S INVESTORS, LLC V. NORRIS" on Justia Law

After the death of Roxine Poznich in 2020, her revocable living trust became the subject of a dispute among her five children, who were named as beneficiaries. Sarah Tharrett, one of the children, was appointed successor trustee. David Everett, another child, challenged Sarah’s role and actions as trustee, first by suing for her removal (which was dismissed), and later by objecting to the final trust accounting and distribution. While all other beneficiaries approved the final accounting, David’s objections prevented the trust from being closed. Sarah then filed a declaratory action seeking court approval to distribute the trust assets and requested attorney fees due to David’s conduct.The Bourbon District Court resolved the matter by closing the trust, releasing Sarah from her duties, ordering distribution of the remaining assets, and awarding $4,000 in attorney fees against David’s share. David appealed but accepted his distribution check. Sarah filed a notice of acquiescence, arguing that David’s acceptance of the distribution barred his appeal. The Kansas Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to acquiescence, and denied Sarah’s request for appellate attorney fees, reasoning it lacked jurisdiction to consider the fee request.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that due process violations only void a judgment if they so undermine personal jurisdiction that the party is denied any meaningful opportunity to be heard, which was not the case here. The court affirmed that a trust beneficiary who accepts a distribution cannot later challenge the amount on appeal, as the benefits are inseparable from any additional claims. The court also clarified that appellate courts retain jurisdiction to award attorney fees even if the appeal is dismissed for acquiescence. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of David’s appeal and awarded Sarah $11,320 in appellate attorney fees. View "Tharrett v. Everett " on Justia Law

David Wolfe owned property in Columbia Falls, Montana. In 2000, he executed a will leaving the property to his daughter, Wendy Rae Wolfe. In 2018, David signed a beneficiary deed transferring the property to his brother, Philip M. Wolfe. David passed away in 2023, and Wendy began residing on the property, believing it was hers per the will. Philip, however, claimed ownership based on the 2018 deed and issued a notice for Wendy to vacate.Wendy filed a pro se quiet title action in December 2023, alleging that the will conveyed the property to her and that Philip obtained the deed fraudulently, either by forging David’s signature or through undue influence. Philip counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granted summary judgment in favor of Philip, concluding that Wendy failed to produce a legally meaningful challenge to the deed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court found that Wendy presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding undue influence and the validity of David’s signature on the deed. The court noted that Wendy’s evidence, including affidavits and personal knowledge of David’s intentions, was enough to warrant a jury’s consideration. The court concluded that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Philip and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of David Wolfe" on Justia Law

A former Newark policeman, Keith Isaac, applied for special retirement in 2013, listing his estranged spouse, Roxanne, as his wife on the application. His retirement was approved in 2016, retroactive to August 1, 2014, resulting in $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits. Isaac passed away before receiving these benefits, and the Division of Pensions and Benefits distributed the unpaid benefits to Roxanne in March 2017. Isaac’s estate requested reconsideration, arguing that the benefits should be paid to the estate. The Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) upheld the decision, stating that Isaac had designated Roxanne as his beneficiary.The estate appealed to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), which affirmed the Board’s decision, reasoning that listing Roxanne as his spouse on the retirement application constituted a beneficiary designation. The estate then appealed to the Appellate Division, which remanded the case to the OAL for a supplemental hearing to determine Isaac’s probable intent regarding the unpaid benefits.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.2 mandates that unpaid benefits be distributed to the decedent’s estate unless a beneficiary is nominated by written designation. Since Isaac did not make such a designation, the Court ruled that the Board’s decision to distribute the benefits to Roxanne was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to remand for further fact-finding and directed that the $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits be distributed to Isaac’s estate. View "Isaac v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System" on Justia Law

Robert Redland's parents accumulated ranching property in the Big Horn Basin, which Robert and his wife, Irene, later purchased. They raised their five children on these properties and created the Robert and Irene Redland Family Trust in 1989 to manage the ranch properties. Robert promised his children that all ranch properties would be placed in the trust, except for the Manderson Place, which would be placed in the trust after his and Irene's deaths. In 2007, Robert and Irene sold an 11-acre parcel of the Manderson Place to their daughter Lisa and her husband, Mike Kimsey. The Redland Children discovered that the Manderson Place and other properties were not in the trust and sued Robert and the Kimseys.The District Court of Big Horn County initially ruled that Robert must transfer the disputed properties to the trust, including the 11 acres sold to the Kimseys. However, the court later amended its judgment, removing the requirement for the 11 acres to be transferred to the trust, as the Redland Children had not stated a claim against the Kimseys for the return of the 11 acres. The Redland Children did not appeal this amendment.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, except for the provision regarding the Manderson Place, which it ordered to be transferred to the trust immediately, subject to a life estate in Robert. The district court then issued a judgment excluding the 11 acres from the trust, which the Redland Children appealed.The Wyoming Supreme Court held that its previous decision did not require the 11 acres to be transferred to the trust and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Redland Children's motions to amend their complaint and for attorney fees. The court affirmed the district court's judgment exempting the 11 acres from being transferred to the trust. View "Redland v. Kimsey" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs-appellees, trustees of the Peter and Elizabeth C. Tower Foundation, who brought claims against UBS Financial Services, Inc. and Jay S. Blair (collectively, the "UBS Defendants") under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and New York state law. The plaintiffs allege that the UBS Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in managing the Foundation's investment advisory accounts. Specifically, they claim that John N. Blair, the father of Jay Blair, improperly used his position to place the Foundation’s assets with his son's investment firm, which later became affiliated with UBS.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the UBS Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to question the validity of the arbitration agreement, warranting a trial on that issue. The UBS Defendants had previously moved to stay or dismiss the action under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., which held that courts may not impose a prejudice requirement when evaluating whether a party has waived enforcement of an arbitration agreement. The Second Circuit concluded that the UBS Defendants waived their right to compel arbitration by seeking a resolution of their dispute in the District Court first, thus acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the UBS Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the alternative ground of waiver. View "Doyle v. UBS Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law