Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-respondent Keely Rickard purchased the subject residential real property from the Coulimore Family Living Trust, U/A/D March 6, 2014 ("the Coulimore Trust"). Rickard later sued Defendants-petitioners Jonathan Coulimore and Elinor Coulimore, individually, and as Trustees of the Coulimore Trust, for damages from defects they failed to disclose. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order to determine whether the transaction was exempt from the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act (RPCDA). The Court found the transaction was a transfer by a fiduciary who was not an owner occupant of the subject property in the course of the administration of a trust and, pursuant to 60 O.S.2011 section 838(A)(3), the transaction was exempt from the RPCDA. The Court therefore affirmed partial summary judgment as to the inapplicability of the RPCDA and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rickard v. Coulimore" on Justia Law

David Miles appealed a circuit court order denying his postjudgment motion seeking to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment appointing a guardian for Nadine Chalmers. The administration of the guardianship was purportedly removed to the circuit court from probate court. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the removal was not proper under section 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, and thus, the circuit court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal. View "Miles v. Helms" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming an order of the probate court admitting the last will and testament of Barbara J. Cardiff, holding that the trial justice did not err in affirming the probate court because the will met the necessary formalities of R.I. Gen. Laws 33-5-5.Before the superior court, Petitioners argued that the will did not conform with the requirements of section 33-5-5 because it was not subscribed by two witnesses, but rather, a witness and a notary public. The trial justice determined that the will was signed by two witness, thus affirming the probate court's order admitting the will to probate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err as to any of the issues raised by Petitioners. View "In re Estate of Barbara J. Cardiff" on Justia Law

In 2018, five of the late Richard Redd’s six children (Petitioners) sought the appointment of a conservator and guardian over their mother, Joyce Redd. They also sought various temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions to prevent Joyce from taking further financial action without their approval. Petitioners claimed their brother, Brian Redd, unduly coerced Joyce into financial decisions detrimental to her estate. Joyce filed a motion for summary judgment as to the conservatorship issue, which the chancery court granted. The chancellor found Petitioners failed to produce certificates from at least two examining physicians stating that Joyce was unable to manage her own personal and financial affairs. Regions Bank, as the trustee of the trusts at issue, moved for mediation regarding the remaining issues. The chancellor granted Regions’ motion and, after mediation, the parties settled the case. Disagreements later arose regarding the terms of the settlement, which the chancery court resolved in favor of Petitioners. Both Joyce and Petitioners appealed the final judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the final judgment. View "In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Joyce G. Redd" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal with prejudice of Marilyn Newsome’s breach of contract claim against Peoples Bancshares, Inc., d/b/a Peoples Bank. The trial court found that the Bank reasonably relied on Keely McNulty’s apparent authority as Marilyn’s agent when issuing court-ordered cashier’s checks from Victoria Newsome’s conservatorship account without Marilyn’s approval or signature as the account holder. Marilyn appealed. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the chancellor was not with reasonable certainty manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, and because substantial evidence supported the chancellor’s findings that McNulty possessed apparent authority, it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Marilyn’s claims against the Bank. View "Newsome v. Peoples Bancshares, Inc. d/b/a Peoples Bank" on Justia Law

The Medi-Cal program, California’s enactment of the federal Medicaid program, was administered by the California Department of Health Care Services (the department) administers the Medi-Cal program. In this case, the department sought reimbursement from a revocable inter vivos trust for the Medi-Cal benefits provided on behalf of Joseph Snukst during his lifetime. Following his death, the probate court ordered the assets in the revocable inter vivos trust to be distributed to the sole beneficiary, Shawna Snukst, rather than to the department. The Court of Appeal concluded federal and state law governing revocable inter vivos trusts, as well as public policy, required that the department be reimbursed from the trust before any distribution to its beneficiary. Judgment was therefore reversed and remanded. View "Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst" on Justia Law

Mutual sold fractional investment interests in viatical settlements in which a terminally ill insured sold his life insurance policy to a third party for a lump-sum cash payment--a percentage of the policy’s face value. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Mutual for falsely representing that its life expectancy figures, “of paramount importance” for valuing the settlements, had been produced by independent physicians. The Mutual policies were put into receivership; investors were given the option of retaining their investments or directing the receiver to sell. Some of the "Keep" investors did not pay their share of premiums, leaving the policies at risk of lapse and the non-defaulting investors at risk of losing their investments. Acheron purchased fractional interests of defaulting investors from the receiver.In 2009, the district court approved the transfer and management of the Keep Policies—including some policies in which Acheron held fractional interests—from the receiver to a trustee. The trustee obtained court approval to sell the policies in the trust, including those in which Acheron held an interest. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Acheron’s appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The order is not a final decision, 28 U.S.C. 1291, and did not involve the refusal to wind up a receivership, section 1292(a)(2). View "Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal" on Justia Law

Clark Beach appealed a district court order denying his petition for formal probate of a holographic will. Clark was the brother of Skip Beach (“decedent”). The decedent lived in Golden Valley County, North Dakota. He was survived by seven siblings and one daughter. The will at issue was submitted to informal probate, and co-personal representatives were appointed. Clark filed a petition for formal probate of the will. The purported holographic will left everything the decedent owned to Clark. The court entered its order denying the petition for formal probate of the holographic will. The court found the signature “Skip Beach” on the proposed holographic will was the decedent’s signature based on the evidence. The court held the clause “Everything I own” was a material portion and was not in the decedent’s handwriting. The court reasoned that the clause appeared to have been written in different ink, was lighter in appearance, and was slanted different than the rest of the document. Additionally, the court found the clause was smaller in text and was written in only printed letters while other portions of the document use a mix of cursive and printed letters. The court stated the testimony given by Clark Beach, his siblings, and others did not change the court’s finding and stated “[n]one of these individuals are handwriting experts, and none of them ever saw this purported will before Skip’s death.” The court held that Clark Beach failed to meet his burden of proof that a material portion of the document was in the testator’s handwriting as required by law. Clark argued the district court erred in finding the material portions of the holographic will were not in the testator’s handwriting. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the petition for formal probate. View "Estate of Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants for breach of an agreement, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens.Plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, and his sister, a resident of California, were beneficiaries of separate trusts (the BRT and the MRT). The Trustees that managed the BRT and MRT resided in or had offices in California. The BRT and MRT were each fifty percent members of a California entity that owned property in Wyoming. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted that his sister and the Trustees breached their agreement to sell the MRT's interest in the California entity to BRT. The district court dismissed the complaint based on forum non conveniens and its conclusion that the parties had a separate settlement agreement requiring litigation to be brought in a California probate court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing on the basis of forum non conveniens. View "Lund v. Lund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the superior court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims alleging undue influence in this trusts and estates case, holding that Plaintiffs' claims for intentional interference and unjust enrichment were not time barred.After learning that they had been removed as beneficiaries of their grandfather's trust, Plaintiffs brought suit against their aunts and their grandmother's estate, arguing that their exclusion from the trust arose from undue influence. The superior court dismissed the action, concluding that the claims were time barred under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 203E, 604, which establishes a one-year deadline after the trust settlor's death for actions contesting the validity of a trust. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that their claims did not challenge the validity of the trust and were therefore not time barred. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were substantively different from the trust contests governed by section 604 and were therefore not time barred. View "Sacks v. Dissinger" on Justia Law