Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The underlying judgment encompasses two probate petitions: the first petition was filed on April 26, 2011, by appellants, Everett Earle Pearce, Jr., and Flora Geraldene Crawford (collectively, Pearce Parties), and the second petition was filed on November 30, 2015, by Charles J. Briggs, Jr., and Margaret Briggs Arroyo (collectively, Briggs Parties), in their capacities as trustees of the Charles John Briggs Individual Living Trust Dated December 13, 1995. Each group of claimants filed a petition to establish their claims on the properties, and opposed the petition filed by the other group. The trial court ultimately entered a "Judgment After Trial," denying the Pearce Petition and granting the Briggs Petition. The Pearce Parties appealed.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Ruth L. Brigg's estate is not vested with a 43.75 percent interest in the Gibson Property. In this case, Ruth's will did not sever the joint tenancy in the Gibson Property under Civil Code section 683.2, Subdivision (a)(2). Nor was the joint tenancy in the Gibson Property severed by "other means," unrelated to Ruth's will, under Civil Code section 683.2, subdivision (a). The court also concluded that Ruth's estate is not vested with an undivided 25 percent interest in the Rosedale Property; the Pearce Parties' real property claims are time-barred; the trial court correctly concluded that Charles John Briggs, Sr's 1995 trust was the proper record owner of the relevant interests in the Gibson and Rosedale properties; and the remaining contentions raised by the Pearce Parties fail. View "Pearce v. Briggs" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of damages after a bench trial that resulted in a judgment in favor of appellees and a group of state guaranty associations where the district court ruled that Allegiant Bank breached its fiduciary duties in administering seven trusts, and that PNC was liable for the breach as the successor-in-interest to National City Bank, which in turn had acquired Allegiant.The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the compensatory damages award; even assuming for the sake of analysis that Missouri law does require damages to be readily ascertainable to award prejudgment interest, the court still found no basis for reversal of the award of prejudgment interest; assuming that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) was not the proper source of authority for the district court's correction of a clerical mistake, any error was harmless; considered in its entirety, the evidence supports an award of punitive damages; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and PNC's claims to the contrary are unavailing. View "Jo Ann Howard & Assoc., PC v. National City Bank" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning the validity of a Transfer of Death Agreement (TOD agreement) executed by Alton L. Flanders, III, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff had met her burden of showing that Flanders lacked capacity at the time he entered into the TOD Agreement, holding that there was no reversible error.The TOD agreement in this case related to an account containing a subset of Flanders's assets for which Merrill Lynch acted as custodian. The agreement, if valid, avoided probate of an at-death transfer of the account assets to five designated beneficiaries, including Plaintiff, Flanders's daughter. After Flanders died intestate, Plaintiff claimed that Flanders lacked the mental capacity to enter into the TOD agreement. Merrill Lynch commenced this interpleader action. The district court granted summary judgment to the beneficiaries who consented to the distribution of the account assets per the terms of the TOD agreement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims on appeal were unavailing. View "Merrill Lynch v. Flanders-Borden" on Justia Law

Mathew Finch appealed a district court order related to the administration of the Estate of Janel Finch (“Estate”). Finch argued the court erred in granting Christine Binstock’s petition to remove Finch as a co-personal representative from the estate, erred in denying his counter-petition to remove Binstock as co-personal representative, and erred in denying his attorney’s fees request. (Finch and Binstock were siblings). Finding no abuse of discretion, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Estate of Finch" on Justia Law

After her husband Benny Wall (decedent) died, petitioner Cindy Wall (wife) petitioned the probate court to determine that a home, titled in decedent’s name, was community property. Decedent’s children, objectors Timothy Wall and Tamara Nimmo (the children) unsuccessfully objected. On appeal, the children contended the trial court erred: (1) in determining the Family Code section 760 community property presumption prevailed over the Evidence Code section 662 form of title presumption; (2) in failing to consider tracing evidence rebutting the community property presumption; (3) in determining the Family Code section 721 undue influence presumption prevailed over the Evidence Code section 662 form of title presumption; and (4) by applying the undue influence presumption where there was no showing of unfair advantage. Though the Court of Appeal concluded the first two contentions had merit, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Estate of Wall" on Justia Law

Theodore Branch, Jr., Denise Whisenhunt, Wanda Standfield, Yulonda Branch, Monique Branch, and Darin Branch appealed a circuit court order dismissing their action challenging their father's will based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Theodore W. Branch, Sr. ("the father"), died testate December 3, 2019, survived by his seven children: Angela Branch, Theodore Branch, Jr., Denise Whisenhunt, Wanda Standfield, Yulonda Branch, Monique Branch, and Darin Branch. Angela petitioned the probate court to probate a will that the father had executed on October 31, 2018. The will devised all of the father's property to Angela and omitted any reference to the father's other six children. On March 6, 2020, the omitted children filed a response to Angela's petition to probate the will in which they contested the validity of the will, asserting that the father had not been competent to execute the will and that Angela had exerted undue influence to procure the father's execution of the will and to obtain from the father the transfer of real property. The omitted children also asserted that a previous will executed by the father in 2017 better reflected his final wishes. The Alabama Supreme Court found the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the omitted children's action because they did not strictly comply with statutory prerequisites to invoke that court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the circuit court correctly dismissed the action. View "Branch, et al. v. Branch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the district court on summary judgment invalidating a transfer-on-death (TOD) executed by Wife before her death naming Daughter as the designated beneficiary to her interest in a house titled solely in Wife's name and dismissing Daughter's counterclaim for slander of title, holding that the TOD deed was not invalid.Husband, who died during the course of these proceedings, brought this action alleging that he was the rightful owner of the house at issue because, in part, the TOD deed was invalid because "Nebraska deeds conveying an interest in real property held by a married person must be executed by both spouses." Daughter counterclaimed for slander of title. The court sustained Husband's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the TOD deed was void as a matter of law for failing to satisfy Neb. Rev. Stat. 40-104. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as a matter of law, section 40-104 does not apply to TOD deeds; and (2) the TOD in this case was not void, and Daughter counterclaim was no longer moot. View "Chambers v. Bringenberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her late husband, Grant Tinker, signed a premarital agreement (PMA) that in relevant part governed the ownership and testamentary disposition of their marital home. Respondents, Larry Ginsberg and his law firm, represented plaintiff in connection with the PMA and approved the PMA as to form on her behalf. Non-attorney Sidney Tessler, Tinker's longtime accountant and business manager, negotiated terms and approved the PMA as to form on Tinker's behalf. Plaintiff, the estate, and Tinker's children subsequently litigated plaintiff's and the children's claims, which were ultimately resolved in a global settlement.Plaintiff then filed suit against Ginsberg for legal malpractice in connection with the preparation and execution of the PMA, alleging that the PMA was unenforceable due to Ginsberg’s failure to ensure that Tinker signed a waiver of legal representation. The trial court granted Ginsberg's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Tinker ratified the PMA.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the threshold issue of whether Tinker satisfied the requirements of Family Code section 1615 when he executed the PMA. The court explained that, if the factfinder determines that Tinker did not comply with section 1615, and the PMA was therefore not enforceable, the question becomes whether Tinker's subsequent amendments to his estate plan could ratify the PMA and thereby rectify the statutory violation. The court concluded that the trial court erred by concluding that they could and did. The court held that a premarital agreement that is not enforceable under section 1615 is void, not voidable, and accordingly cannot be ratified. Because none of the other grounds asserted in the summary judgment motion support the trial court's ruling, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on plaintiff's malpractice claim. The court denied plaintiff's request for judicial notice as moot. View "Knapp v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law

Tim Dwyer Jr. appeals an amended judgment deciding his claims against Margaret Sell and John Dwyer as co-trustees of the Tim Dwyer Farm Trust. The co-trustees and Jane Dwyer Morgan and Barbara Dwyer Rice, as beneficiaries of the Trust, cross-appealed the amended judgment. The district court concluded the co-trustees had broad discretion to sell Trust property, any sale of Trust property had to be under a contract for deed with no option for prepayment and a reservation of a right to access Trust property for hunting was prohibited. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dwyer v. Sell, et al." on Justia Law

This is appellant's third appeal concerning the conservatorship of the person and estate of his mother, Norma Farrant. The Court of Appeal affirmed the probate court's orders requiring him to pay $63,448.90 for misappropriation of Norma's assets, surcharging in the same amount appellant's share of interpled funds, and imposing sanctions of $121,000 for failing to timely file an accounting of his actions relating to Norma's estate.The court concluded that the probate court did not erroneously order accounting where there was a special relationship between appellant and Norma that warranted the order compelling appellant to account for the pension checks and rental income, and the probate court did not err because there was a fiduciary relationship between appellant and Norma. The court also concluded that appellant forfeited his claim that the probate court's order was based on affidavits and declarations where he did not object to the probate court's consideration of these items. Finally, the court concluded that the probate court properly denied appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing; appellant has not shown prejudice; and appellant's new claims lack merit. View "Friend v. Farrant" on Justia Law