Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's appeal from an order entered by the Marion County Commission declaring the holographic will of Oras Dye to be void and rescinding Petitioner's appointment as the executor of the Estate of Oras Dye, holding that the circuit court erred.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the fiduciary supervisor and the county commission lacked statutory authority investigate the validity of the will and unilaterally to declare it void after the will had been admitted to probate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the judiciary supervisor lacked authority to investigate the validity of the will, which had already been admitted to probate; and (2) the county commission lacked authority to revoke the will's prior admission to probate. View "Dye v. County Commission of Marion County" on Justia Law

Henry H. Behle IV appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Darren Harr as the personal representative of the Estate of Henry L. Behle. The district court held Behle’s claims against the Estate concerning two parcels of real estate were untimely under N.D.C.C. 30.1-19-03(2), which barred certain claims that were not brought within three months of a decedent’s death. The court also held Behle’s claim to personal property was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for conversion under N.D.C.C. 28-01-16. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Behle v. Harr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order and judgment of the circuit court enforcing a settlement agreement, holding that the Statute of Frauds was applicable in this case.After a dispute over an alleged forgery in a will, the parties reached a mediation agreement as to certain property. The trial court adopted the mediation agreement as part of its judgment and ordered it to be enforced. The court of appeals appealed, ruling that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Statute of Frauds was applicable, barring enforcement of the agreement. View "Adamson v. Adamson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Peter Dodier, appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) order denying the estate’s claim for workers’ compensation and death benefits following Peter Dodier’s death. The CAB denied the estate’s claim based on its determination that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were not a compensable injury. It therefore did not reach the issue of death benefits. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were compensable, it reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for its consideration of whether the estate was entitled to death benefits. View "Appeal of Estate of Peter Dodier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting demurrers as to all claims filed by John Mark Rohrbaugh Sr.'s daughter seeking both an equitable and a statutory accounting from her brother in his former capacity as an agent managing their father's financial affairs pursuant to a power of attorney (POA) and in his current capacity as co-executor of their father's estate, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this complaint against John Mark Rohrbaugh Jr. in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a co-executor of the Rohrbaugh Sr. estate requesting a statutory accounting from Rohrbaugh Jr. concerning his actions pursuant to his father's POA and requesting an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted the demurrers to the complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed on demurrer Plaintiff's equitable and statutory accounting claims. View "Phillips v. Rohrbaugh" on Justia Law

In 2006, Rose Rellick (decedent) purchased two certificates of deposit ("CDs") listing as co-owners herself, her sister appellee Betty Rellick, and the daughters of her deceased brother George, appellee Kimberly Vasil and appellant Sharleen Rellick-Smith. Prior to purchasing the CDs, Decedent executed powers of attorney designating Betty and Kimberly as her attorneys-in-fact. It purportedly was Decedent’s intention that, upon her death, the proceeds of the CDs be divided equally among Appellant and Appellees. However, prior to Decedent’s death, Appellees removed Appellant’s name from the CDs. In March 2013, subsequent to Decedent’s death, Appellees cashed the CDs, which were worth approximately $370,000, and divided the money between the two of them. In 2014, Appellant filed an action against Appellees, claiming they breached their fiduciary duties to Decedent by removing Appellant’s name from the CDs and refusing to pay her any of the proceeds. Appellees filed a timely response to the complaint, but, relevant to this appeal, did not raise any affirmative defenses therein. Four months later, Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Appellant lacked standing and that her claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellees’ motion was ultimately granted on the basis that Appellant lacked standing. Notably, however, the trial judge determined that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as a new matter in their answer, as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the Superior Court erred in affirming an order of the trial court that permitted the appellees to file an amended answer to include the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, which a different trial court judge previously ruled was waived. The Supreme Court concluded the second trial judge’s order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule in this regard, thus the Superior Court erred in affirming the second court's order. The Superior Court decision was reversed, the trial judge's order vacated in part, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, et al." on Justia Law

The Heitings’ Revocable Trust, administered by BMO, filed no tax returns; the Heitings reported its gains and losses on their returns. With respect to two stocks, BMO had no discretionary power to take any action, including any sale or purchase of the stock. Nonetheless, in 2015 BMO sold the restricted stock, incurring a taxable gain of $5,643,067.50. The Heitings included that gain on their 2015 personal tax return. BMO subsequently realized that the sale was prohibited, and in 2016, purchased shares of the restricted stock with the proceeds from the earlier transaction.The Heitlings sought to invoke the claim of right doctrine. 26 U.S.C. 1341 to claim a deduction on their 2016 return: A taxpayer must report income in the year in which it was received, even if the taxpayer could later be required to return the income but would then be entitled to a deduction in the repayment year; alternatively, taxpayers may recompute their taxes for the year of receipt of the income. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Heitings’ suit. Under section 1341(a)(2), the Heitings had to show that the repayment occurred because “it was established after the close of such prior taxable year" that the taxpayer "did not have an unrestricted right to such item.” It was not established that the Trust did not have an unrestricted right to the income item. The Heitlings never challenged the purchase or sale of the restricted stock. View "Heiting v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dispute over a challenged provision in a revocable trust, holding that the challenged provision was not an impermissible restraint against marriage.When Marcille Borcherding died, she left her estate in trust in children. At issue was one trust provision stating that her son's interest will be distributed to him directly if he is unmarried at the time of her death but that if he is married when she dies, his interest will be held in trust. Her son sued, alleging that the provision was a void restraint against marriage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory prohibition against restraints on marriage applies only to a devise to a spouse by will and not to other dispositions; and (2) the son's ancillary due process claim failed. View "Rotert v. Stiles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Thomas Pribil and William Kilzer (together, Appellees), the copersonal representatives of the estate of Charles E. Lakin and the cotrustees of the Charles E. Lakin Revocable Trust, holding that a dispute of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.Appellant in this case was the Charles E. Lakin Foundation, Inc. Appellant argued that Appellees improperly paid Pribil approximately $7 million after Lakin's death. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pribil and Kilzer in their individual and representative capacities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a dispute of material fact existed regarding the foundation's fudicairy duty claims against Appellees as copersonal representatives and cotrustees. View "In re Estate of Lakin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order issued by the district court concerning the conservatorship and estate planning efforts of Appellant's elderly mother, H.D.K., holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it declined to issue a scheduling order; (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to quash a subpoena for the file of H.D.K.'s attorney; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the conservatorship hearing after three days; (4) did not err when it issued findings regarding how H.D.K. intended to allocate her estate; (5) did not err by determining the present values of the properties in H.D.K.'s estate; and (6) did not err when it found H.D.K. had testamentary capacity. View "In re H.D.K." on Justia Law