Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Alan Albrecht appeals from a district court judgment dismissing his complaint against Mark Albrecht with prejudice. The background for this case stemmed from prior litigation in the divorce proceedings of Glen and Sharleen Albrecht (Alan and Mark's parents), and continuing in the probate of Sharleen Albrecht’s estate. Alan named his brother Mark and Mark's wife as defendants in a complaint alleging contempt of court and unjust enrichment. He alleged that, while Glen and Sharleen's divorce was pending and restraining provisions were in effect, their late-mother Sharleen Albrecht changed the beneficiary designation on an investment account owned by her, removing Alan as one of the beneficiaries and naming only Mark as the transfer-on-death beneficiary. He further alleged that, in contravention of the divorce summons and interim order’s restraining provisions, Sharleen liquidated the investment account and the proceeds from the liquidated account were subsequently transferred to Mark after Sharleen's death. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Alan lacked standing to bring the action, so it affirmed dismissal. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht, et al." on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a child placed for adoption was a pretermitted heir under the terms of the will. The decedent, Judith K. Pratt, left her entire estate to her caregivers and friends, neglecting any family. Her son, plaintiff-appellant Robinson Rogers, which she gave up for adoption at birth but whom she later established a relationship with, objected to the admittance of Pratt's will to probate. He alleged that he was a pretermitted heir, and that the will was procured as the result of undue influence by Pratt's caregivers. The trial court determined that Rogers was not a pretermitted heir and admitted the will to probate. Rogers appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that Rogers qualified as a pretermitted heir, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that the omission was intentional. View "Rogers v. Estate of Pratt" on Justia Law

After defendant died while his appeal was pending, counsel moved for abatement of all incidents of the prosecution, requesting that the appeal be dismissed without a decision on the merits, that defendant's conviction be vacated, and that the matter be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment and order repayment to defendant's estate of the $20,000 fine and $100 special assessment.Because defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty, and he neither did nor was permitted to challenge on appeal the merits of his conviction, the Second Circuit denied as without merit so much of the motion as seeks (1) vacatur of his conviction, (2) dismissal of the count of the indictment on which he was convicted, and (3) repayment of the mandatory $100 special assessment. The court granted so much of the motion as requests dismissal of this appeal and a remand to the district court for vacatur of the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release and for an order requiring that the paid fine of $20,000 be repaid to defendant's estate. View "United States v. Mladen" on Justia Law

Daniel Tewksbury and Bobbie Young were previously married and were the parents of two minor children, Lane and Emma. They divorced in May 2006, and Daniel was ordered to pay child support. Daniel stopped making child-support payments in 2008. Bobbie later married Gerald Young, Jr. Gerald filed a petition to adopt Lane and Emma. In the adoption, Daniel’s parental rights were terminated. As of the termination of his parental rights, Daniel owed Bobbie $34,759 for child support. On April 5, 2015, Daniel died in an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Daniel was in the course and scope of his employment with Air Masters Mechanical, Inc. Bobbie then filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of Lane and Emma, claiming that the children were entitled to Daniel’s workers’ compensation death-benefit proceeds and sought the payment of the $34,759 in outstanding child support. The Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that the child-support lien of $34,759 was valid and payable under Section 71-3-129. Air Masters and Associated General Contractors filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Lane and Emma were not entitled to Daniel’s death benefits because they were not his statutory dependents under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-25 (Supp. 2019). The Commission reversed the AJ’s order and dismissed Bobbie’s petition. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding the child-support lien was valid. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 71-3-129 did not authorize a lien on death benefits payable directly to the deceased employee’s statutory dependents. Accordingly, the child-support lien did not apply to Daniel’s death benefits. Further, because Daniel had no statutory dependents, there were simply no benefits to which the lien can attach in this case. As a result, the Commission properly dismissed the claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was reinstated and affirmed. View "Young v. Air Masters Mechanical Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' second action against Defendants, the trustees of their parents' trust, because a prior action had been filed in and decided by the district court, holding that Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate under the circumstances.In the earlier action, Plaintiffs filed a notice-order-motion to remove trustees and for other relief, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The district court denied the requested relief. The circuit court affirmed. While Plaintiffs' appeal was pending in the circuit court they filed the instant proceeding in the circuit court alleging that Defendants breached their statutory and common law duties. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and remand to the district court on the grounds that Ky. Rev. Stat. 386B.2-030 vested the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the same trust matter which had been before it. The circuit court denied the motion but remanded the matter to the district court, concluding that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the underlying matter and claims in the two cases were different, and therefore, Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate. View "Hauber v. Hauber" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, the “Estate”), brought this action against Defendant-Appellee, Betty Diamond (“Diamond”), the former wife of Gregory Diamond (the “Decedent”). The complaint alleged the Decedent was a federal employee who had a Thrift Savings Plan account (the “TSP Account”) administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (“FRTIB”). During Diamond’s marriage to the Decedent, she was the named beneficiary of Decedent’s TSP Account. When Diamond and the Decedent divorced in 2013, they entered into a divorce decree containing the following provision relevant to the Decedent’s TSP Account: “The parties have acquired an interest in retirement accounts during the course of the marriage. [Diamond] waive[s] her interest in [Decedent’s] retirement accounts. Therefore, [Decedent] is awarded any and all interest in his retirement accounts, free and clear of any claim of [Diamond].” When the Decedent died in 2017, however, Diamond was still designated as the beneficiary of the TSP Account. The Estate requested that Diamond waive all her interest in any distribution she received from the TSP Account. After Diamond refused and indicated her intent to retain any monies distributed to her, the Estate filed a declaratory judgment action against her in Utah’s Third Judicial District Court. Diamond removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss the Estate’s complaint. The district court granted the motion, concluding the Estate’s breach of contract claims against Diamond are preempted by federal law governing the administration of TSP accounts. Finding that the district court correctly concluded the relevant provisions of the Federal Employee Retirement Systems Act (“FERSA”) preempted any conflicting Utah state property rights, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Evans v. Diamond" on Justia Law

Under 26 U.S.C. 2036(a)(1), a grantor's interest in a grantor-retained annuity trust (GRAT) is a sufficient "string" that requires the property interest to be included in the gross estate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the IRS in an action brought by plaintiff, challenging the inclusion of her mother's GRAT in a gross estate for purposes of the estate tax. The panel explained that the annuity flowing from a GRAT falls within the class intended to be treated as substitutes for wills by section 2036(a)(1). In this case, the panel held that the grantor retains enjoyment of a GRAT and thus it is properly included in the gross estate. Finally, even if plaintiff's challenges to 26 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1(c)(2), which includes the formula the IRS uses to calculate the portion of the property includable under section 2036(a) were not waived, the formula would not apply in this case. View "Badgley v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Dansker obtained an $83,000 home loan to purchase Las Vegas real estate. In 2009, Dansker died. No probate proceedings were instituted. In 2011, the neighborhood HOA began foreclosure proceedings and sold the property to LN. The priority lien-holder was Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The district court held that LN had not identified any legal representative of Dansker’s estate, and since no such person was identified and joined, complete diversity existed. The district court dismissed and denied a motion to substitute Dansker’s daughter.The Ninth Circuit vacated. Diversity did exist at the time of removal. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a motion to substitute, so diversity jurisdiction continued to exist. The lawsuit was against Chase and Dansker. Dansker, being dead, had no legal existence, and, therefore, was not a citizen of any state. Jurisdiction exists where the federal entity is not the record beneficiary on the deed of trust but can prove its property interest through admissible evidence.The Federal Foreclosure Bar, which provides that FHFA's property shall not be subject to foreclosure without FHFA's consent, applies and is fatal to LN’s case on the merits. View "LN Management, LLC Series 5664 Divot V. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

Borrower filed suit under federal and state regulations for consumer credit transactions against the lenders, alleging that the lender's loan disclosures were materially inconsistent with the terms of the loan. At issue in this appeal was whether the loan the borrower obtained to make repairs to a personal residence occupied by her niece should be considered a consumer credit transaction. The district court held that, because the borrower did not intend to live in the house, this was not a consumer credit transaction.The Ninth Circuit held that, under applicable statutes and regulations, a trust created by an individual for tax and estate planning purposes, like the one in this case, does not lose all state and federal consumer disclosure protections when it seeks to finance repairs to a personal residence for the trust beneficiary, rather than for the trustee herself. Therefore, the transaction remains a consumer credit transaction. Because the district court erred in construing the statutes in this case too narrowly, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilliam v. Levine" on Justia Law

In this dispute between a trust's trustee and beneficiary the Supreme Court granted the trustee's original writ petition seeking a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, mandamus on the grounds that a discovery order was improper as a matter of law, holding that neither the trust instrument nor Nevada trust law required the trustee to consider the beneficiary's other assets before making distributions from the trust.This case concerned three trusts - the Raggio Trust and its two subtrusts, the Marital Trust and the Credit Shelter Trust. The Raggio Trust named Trustee as the trustee and life beneficiary of the subtrusts. Respondents were named as remainder beneficiaries of the Marital Trust. Respondents sued Trustee alleging that Trustee improperly distributed funds from the Marital Trust and paid herself distributions in amounts that were more than necessary for her proper support, care and maintenance. To prove their claim, Respondents sought discovery of Trustee's accounting and distributions of the Credit Shelter Trust. The district court granted the motion to compel discovery. The Supreme Court granted Trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 163.4176 nor the Raggio Trust required Trustee to consider her other assets in making distributions from the Marital Trust, and therefore, information about those assets was irrelevant. View "Raggio v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law