Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Melissa Evans was involved in a fatal car accident with Darrell D. Blaylock, resulting in the deaths of both Evans and George D. Blaylock, a passenger in Blaylock's car. Joshua Evans, Melissa's son, initiated probate proceedings and was named the personal representative of her estate. Joshua later sought a court order to declare Melissa's house as qualifying for the homestead exemption. The probate court denied this request, leading Joshua to file an interlocutory appeal.The District Court of Rogers County admitted Melissa's will to probate, named Joshua as the personal representative, and identified the heirs. Deborah Matlock, representing George Blaylock's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Melissa's estate and a creditor demand for inventory. Joshua's motion to declare the house as a homestead was denied after he failed to appear at the hearing. The probate court ruled that the property did not qualify for the homestead exemption as Melissa left no surviving spouse or minor children.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the property did not qualify for either a constitutional or probate homestead exemption. The court clarified that the homestead exemption under Oklahoma law is limited to a surviving spouse and minor children, and does not extend to adult children or grandchildren. Consequently, Joshua Evans and his children were not entitled to the homestead exemption, and the property was available to satisfy the debts of Melissa Evans' estate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EVANS" on Justia Law

Bonny Babin Maloney passed away in May 2020, leaving behind a will that included a no-contest clause. Her husband, Robert Maloney, Sr., had predeceased her in June 2019, and his will also contained a no-contest clause. Upon Robert Sr.'s death, Mrs. Maloney inherited various assets, including the family home. Mrs. Maloney's will bequeathed the family home to her daughter Julie and included a clause disinheriting any heir who contested the will or engaged in a controversy against the executor concerning her estate.Robert Jr. and Kurt, two of Mrs. Maloney's children, filed a petition in Robert Sr.'s succession to annul the codicils of his will, claiming lack of testamentary capacity. They obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Craig, the executor of both estates, from administering the assets, including the family home. The trial court ruled that Robert Sr. had testamentary capacity and disinherited Robert Jr. and Kurt under the no-contest clause in Robert Sr.'s will. Craig then sought to enforce the no-contest clause in Mrs. Maloney's will, arguing that the TRO violated the clause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the no-contest clause in Mrs. Maloney's will was enforceable. The court held that the clause was clear and unambiguous, and Robert Jr. and Kurt's actions in obtaining the TRO against Craig, in his capacity as executor of Mrs. Maloney's estate, triggered the clause. Consequently, Robert Jr. and Kurt were disinherited from Mrs. Maloney's estate. The court affirmed the lower court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Craig, upholding the enforcement of the no-contest clause. View "SUCCESSION OF MALONEY" on Justia Law

Linda Ager Coyle, the personal representative of Fred Ager's estate, filed a motion for confirmation of a specific devise related to the proceeds from the sale of storage units Fred had owned. Fred's will directed that the units be given in equal shares to his children, Linda and Jeff, with a life estate interest in half of the net rental income to his wife, Arlene Ager. Arlene filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate, which the circuit court granted. Subsequently, the court denied Linda's motion for confirmation of the specific devise.Linda appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion, and Arlene filed a notice of review seeking to challenge the court's earlier decision denying her motion to remove Linda as the personal representative. The Supreme Court of South Dakota issued an order to show cause, directing the parties to address whether the order denying the motion to confirm a specific devise was appealable. Linda argued that the order was appealable based on the precedent set in In re Estate of Geier, which held that each proceeding in an unsupervised administration is a final order. Arlene contended that the order was not final and not subject to review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a decision made prior to a final order terminating a supervised probate action is not governed by the Geier final order rule. The court emphasized that supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding under SDCL 29A-3-501, which contrasts with the multiple, independent proceedings allowed under SDCL 29A-3-107 for unsupervised administration. Since the order for supervised administration was signed before the denial of Linda's motion, the action had become a supervised administration, and the individual-proceeding rule of finality did not apply. Consequently, the court also dismissed Arlene's notice of review. View "Estate Of Ager" on Justia Law

Beneficiaries of a family trust sued the co-trustees, alleging mismanagement and the creation of a secret trust to withhold funds. They sought a declaratory judgment, accountings, and damages. The district court excluded all evidence of damages due to the beneficiaries' failure to provide a damages calculation as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the co-trustees, as the beneficiaries could not prove damages and were not entitled to a declaratory judgment or accountings.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana initially handled the case. The court granted the co-trustees' motion in limine to exclude damages evidence and subsequently granted summary judgment on all claims. The court found that the beneficiaries failed to provide a timely damages calculation and that their claims were time-barred under Louisiana law. The beneficiaries appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the damages evidence. The appellate court applied the "CQ factors" to determine that the exclusion was justified due to the importance of the evidence, the prejudice to the co-trustees, the availability of a continuance, and the beneficiaries' lack of a valid explanation for their delay. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment on all claims, as the beneficiaries could not prove an essential element of their case without the excluded damages evidence. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the beneficiaries' request for a declaratory judgment, as it was remedial in nature and dependent on the underlying claims for recovery. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

Jeffrey G. Grossman and his family sued attorney John Peter Wakeman, Jr. and Wakeman Law Group, Inc. for legal malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that Wakeman negligently prepared estate planning documents for Dr. A. Richard Grossman, which disinherited them in favor of Richard's fourth wife, Elizabeth Grossman. Richard's estate was valued at $18 million, and the plaintiffs argued they were the intended beneficiaries. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $9.5 million in damages.The Ventura County Superior Court denied Wakeman's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Wakeman appealed, arguing that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, as they were not his clients. He contended that his duty was solely to Richard, who had instructed him to leave everything to Elizabeth.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that Wakeman owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that there was no clear, certain, and undisputed evidence of Richard's intent to benefit the plaintiffs. Testimonies from Elizabeth and others supported Wakeman's claim that Richard intended to leave his estate to Elizabeth. The court held that imposing a duty on Wakeman to the plaintiffs would place an intolerable burden on the legal profession.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Wakeman and his law group. The appeal from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was dismissed as moot. View "Grossman v. Wakeman" on Justia Law

Wack Jills USA, Inc., formerly known as Jack Wills, Inc., assigned all its property and assets to SM Financial Services Corporation in August 2019 as part of an assignment for the benefit of creditors (ABC) proceeding. SM Financial, acting as trustee of the JW ABC Trust, sought court approval for final distributions and to close the case. Home Club Realty Trust, a general unsecured creditor, objected to the motion, citing concerns over the handling of certain assets and compliance with statutory requirements.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The Assignee failed to comply with several statutory requirements under the Delaware ABC Statute, including not filing an affidavit of inventory within 30 days of the assignment, not seeking the court’s appointment of two appraisers, and not filing annual accountings. The Assignee also unilaterally posted a bond without court approval and retained its affiliated law firm, SM Law, as counsel, which raised concerns about the compensation structure and potential conflicts of interest.The court found that the Assignee’s pervasive non-compliance with the ABC Statute and its conduct in managing the assignment estate constituted sufficient cause for removal. The court denied the motion to approve final distributions and close the case, and removed SM Financial as Assignee pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 7386. The court extended the term of the Trust until further order and prohibited any distributions from the Trust without court approval. The bond remains in place and may be subject to further proceedings. View "In re Wack Jills, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the sale of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt. Yvonne Engelhart, the personal representative of the estate, sent a notice letter to interested parties, including the Ebels and Tom Gross, outlining the bidding process for the property. The Ebels submitted bids that complied with the notice letter's requirements, while Gross submitted bids that did not meet the specified conditions. Despite this, the estate's attorney initially declared the Ebels the winning bidders but later accepted Gross's bids after he questioned the process.The District Court of McIntosh County initially dismissed the Ebels' claims, concluding the contracts were invalid due to the statute of frauds. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating the statute of frauds was not properly raised. On remand, the district court declared the contracts between the Ebels and the estate valid and ordered specific performance. The court dismissed the Ebels' tortious interference claims against Gross, finding his actions justified.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that valid contracts were formed between the Ebels and the estate when the estate's attorney declared them the winning bidders. The court found that Gross's bids did not comply with the notice letter's requirements and that he had actual notice of the Ebels' winning bids, disqualifying him as a good-faith purchaser. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Ebels' tortious interference claims, concluding Gross's actions were reasonable and justified under the circumstances. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of real property following the death of Billy Skidmore. Billy died intestate in July 2015, leaving behind two sons, John and Billy Jr. The Marshall Probate Court awarded John letters of administration over Billy's estate. Billy Jr. later filed a claim asserting his entitlement to an equal share of the estate. John filed an inventory listing the estate's assets, including a one-third interest in a commercial building. Billy Jr. moved to compel a final settlement, leading to a hearing where John admitted to commingling estate rental proceeds with his personal funds. The probate court subsequently appointed Billy Jr. as the successor administrator and authorized him to list the estate's real property for sale.John discovered a 2004 deed conveying the property to him and Billy as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, which he recorded in July 2023. Despite this, the probate court declared the property to be owned one-third each by John, Jenna (John's ex-wife), and Billy's estate. John removed the administration of the estate to the Marshall Circuit Court and filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the probate court's judgment. The circuit court denied his motion, leading John to appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Marshall Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute over the title to the real property. The court emphasized that probate courts do not have the authority to determine equitable issues or administer equitable remedies, such as setting aside a recorded deed. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Skidmore v. Skidmore" on Justia Law

Thomas Labs, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, sued Amber Marie Dukes and her veterinary supply company for money owed on products delivered. During the litigation, Dukes died, and her counsel filed a notice of death but did not serve any nonparty successors or representatives. Thomas Labs moved to substitute Dukes' trust and trustee, Jason Hilliard, as parties, which the district court granted. Later, Dukes' will was filed in probate court, appointing her brother, Lynn Hill, as personal representative. Dukes' counsel then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither Hilliard nor the trust were proper representatives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against Dukes, concluding that the 180-day deadline for substitution under NRCP 25(a) had passed. The court found that service of the notice of death on the parties alone triggered the deadline, even though no court-appointed executor or administrator existed when the notice was filed. The district court also denied Thomas Labs' motion to substitute a special administrator, Shara Berry, as untimely.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified that under NRCP 25(a), when a decedent's attorney files a notice of death, they must serve the notice on nonparty successors or representatives to start the 180-day deadline for substitution. The court also noted that NRS 7.075 requires the decedent's attorney to file a motion to substitute a proper party within 90 days of the client's death. The Supreme Court found that the 180-day deadline never started because Dukes' counsel failed to serve the nonparty successors or representatives. Consequently, the district court's dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the substitution of a special administrator for Dukes. View "THOMAS LABS, LLC VS. DUKES" on Justia Law

Jerry Simon, the decedent, owned a ranching operation known as Simon Ranch, Inc. He had a will that left all his property to his only child, DeLynn Hanson. Jerry married Lynda Simon in 2011, after executing his will. Lynda filed a petition as an omitted spouse seeking an intestate share of Jerry’s estate under SDCL 29A-2-301, arguing she was entitled to a share because she was not provided for in the will.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, denied Lynda’s petition. The court found that Jerry had provided for Lynda outside of the will with the intent that these transfers were in lieu of any testamentary provision. The court based its decision on evidence that Jerry had transferred assets, including horses and vehicles, into joint ownership with Lynda and had made statements indicating his intent to leave Simon Ranch to his daughter and grandchildren. The court granted Lynda an elective share of 21% of Jerry’s augmented estate under SDCL 29A-2-202.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Jerry intended to provide for Lynda outside of his will. The Supreme Court noted that Jerry’s statements, the amount of the transfers, and other evidence supported the conclusion that Jerry intended to omit Lynda from his will and provide for her through other means. The court upheld the denial of Lynda’s petition for an intestate share and affirmed the grant of an elective share. View "In the Matter of the Estate Of Simon" on Justia Law