Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's claims that Defendants violated various duties when drafting and administering a trust and preparing certain estate planning documents for Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the trust, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err when it found Plaintiff failed to establish a material issue of fact showing that Defendants' actions damaged him; (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint; and (3) did not err by concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff violated the no-contest provision of the trust by bringing an action to void, nullify or set aside a provision of the trust. View "Gowdy v. Cook" on Justia Law

by
The Court of Appeal affirmed the probate court's order granting a petition for instructions allowing the trustee to treat lifetime gifts to trust beneficiaries as advances on their inheritances. The court held that Probate Code section 21135, subdivision (a)(2) has been satisfied where the trial court could reasonably conclude that the Permanent Record was sufficient to satisfy the writing requirement; parole evidence was properly admitted to interpret the writing; subdivision (a)(3) has been satisfied where the trial court could reasonably conclude the emails constitute a written acknowledgement that the distributions were advancements; and the trial court properly found a disparity in payments between the parties. View "Sachs v. Sachs" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of South County Hospital, Home & Hospice Care of Rhode Island and Emmy Mahoney, M.D. (collectively, Defendants), and dismissing all claims alleged by Plaintiff individually and on behalf of the Guardianship of Joyce C. Willner, holding that the trial justice did not err in dismissing the claims.Plaintiff filed an eight-count complaint against Defendants, individually and as guardian of Joyce Willner, his mother. The trial judge granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, dismissing all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) dismissing the claims alleged by Plaintiff on behalf of the guardianship because Joyce had no right to be represented by Plaintiff, who was not authorized to practice law; and (2) denying Plaintiff's request to appoint a guardian ad litem. View "Willner v. South County Hospital" on Justia Law

by
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, holding that Plaintiff's claims were not entitled to judicial review.Plaintiff, in his capacity as trustee for the F2 Liquidating Trust, filed a complaint against the SEC asserting two claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. The district court dismissed the case, determining (1) the right to judicial review of the SEC order at issue had been waived as part of a settlement between the SEC and F-Squared Investments, Inc., a former investment advisory firm; and (2) in any event, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Congress vested the courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to SEC orders. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly decided that the complaint failed to state a claim inasmuch as F-Squared waived judicial review by any court. View "Jalbert v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

by
In this case involving the administration of several family trusts the Supreme Court reversed the denial of a jury trial on Appellant's legal claims and affirmed in all other respects the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition to direct trustee to issue trusts reports and accountings and for removal of trustees and for other relief, holding that the circuit court erred by denying Appellant a jury trial on his legal claims but otherwise did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the chief justice had jurisdiction to appoint a special judge in the case; (2) the circuit court erred by denying Appellant a jury trial on his legal claims, but Appellant was not entitled to a trial by jury on his equitable claims; (3) the circuit court did not err by relying on extrinsic evidence to determine settlor intent; (4) the circuit court did not err by denying Appellant's claim for failure to provide an accounting or in declining to appoint a special master; and (4) the circuit court did not err in not invalidating trust amendments. View "Dawson v. Stoner-Sellers" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals determining that the Jefferson Circuit Court had concurrent jurisdiction over Appellee's breach of trust claims, holding that the Jefferson District Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all breach of trust claims arising out of a Ky. Rev. Stat. 386B.8-180 proceeding.Appellant was trustee of a revocable trust. Pursuant to section 386B.8-180, Appellant filed a petition in Jefferson District Court to approve its statutory notice informing Appellee that a different entity had accepted appointment as the new trustee. Appellee then filed an action in Jefferson Circuit Court alleging several breach of trust claims and filed for removal of the district court action to circuit court. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion for dismissal of the circuit court action. Appellant petitioned for a writ of prohibition, alleging that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition in part, concluding that concurrent jurisdiction existed for the breach of trust claims brought under the separate circuit court action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant followed the proper statutory procedure, any matters within Appellee's circuit court breach of trust action identical to those raised in the section 386B.8-180 proceedings were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the district court. View "PNC Bank, National Ass'n v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

by
The estate of an individual that died as a result of an injury incurred while being a patient of a nursing home sued the nursing home facility in a wrongful death action. The district court entered default judgment for Plaintiff after Defendant failed to file a response or appear in court multiple times. Over 200 days later, Defendant filed a petition to vacate default judgment and the petition was granted. Plaintiff appealed the ruling, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), affirmed the trial court's decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded it was "patently clear" Defendant's arguments for the Petition to Vacate Judgment as to liability was without merit. "[The Nursing Home] Meeker was given a multitude of opportunities to respond to the litigation, but failed to respond to a single instance for 280 days after the initial service of process. Meeker failed to respond to any service of process or appear at any hearing, and did not have an argument with merit to support the inability to respond to the litigation." Accordingly the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment granting the Petition To Vacate Judgment as to liability, and remanded this matter for a trial on damages. View "Williams v. Meeker North Dawson Nursing, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming rulings of the probate court and holding that the father (the decedent)Plaintiffs and Defendant had validly executed a last will and testament on June 9, 2011, holding that the last will and testament executed by the decedent on June 9, 2011 was valid.Plaintiffs alleged that the last will and testament was invalid because, on June 9, 2011, the decedent continued to be subject to a temporary limited guardianship, which included a provision prohibiting the Decedent from revoking or drafting any last will and testament. The superior court justice concluded that because the probate court had, on December 13, 2010, dissolved all portions of the guardianship restricting the decedent's ability to make a will, the last will and testament at issue was not invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the condition limiting the decedent's ability to revoke or draft a last will and testament was extinguished by the probate court in 2010, the last will and testament executed by the decedent in 2011 was valid. View "Duffy v. Scire" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting Walt & Lee Keenihan Foundation, Inc.'s (Foundation) motion for summary judgment and dismissing Heritage Properties Limited Partnership's (Heritage) complaint seeking to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance to the Foundation pursuant to a transfer on death (TOD) beneficiary designation on an account owned by Leta Keenihan, holding that the circuit court erred in deciding this case by summary judgment.Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction in the present case; (2) Heritage, as a creditor, had standing to pursue its claim under the Fraudulent Transfer Act against the Foundation as the transferee; and (3) Heritage was not required to present evidence of Keenihan's intent at the time of the TOD designation, but the evidence raised a factual issue precluding summary judgment as to whether Keenihan reasonably should have believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay. View "Heritage Properties Limited Partnership v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Ralph Placencia died, leaving behind, among other things, a will, a trust, and a joint bank account with an express right of survivorship in favor of one of his daughters, appellant Lisa Strazicich. Ralph left clear statements in his will that he did not want Lisa to have the right of survivorship; he wanted the proceeds of the account to go to his trust so it could benefit all three of his daughters. After his death, Lisa refused to relinquish the funds. Lisa and respondent Stephanie Placencia, another of Ralph’s daughters, both of whom were cotrustees of Ralph’s trust, filed petitions in the probate court to determine the parties’ respective rights. Once established, the terms of a multi-party account” could only be changed by filing the applicable paperwork with the financial institution. The Court of Appeal surmised Ralph clearly expressed the intent to negate survivorship, but the form of the account included a right of survivorship, and Ralph did not use one of the methods listed in Probate Code section 5303 to change the terms of the account. The Court of Appeal recognized the explicit distinction drawn in the the California Multiple-Party Accounts Law (CAMPAL) between the actual ownership of the beneficial interests in the account, and the express terms of the account: the distinction allowed the court to honor the clear intent of the person who established the account while at the same time offer protection to the financial institution which held the account. The Court held that the financial institution was correct to pay the funds to Lisa pursuant to the express terms of the account, but the beneficial owner of the funds was Ralph’s estate. Furthermore, the Court concluded the probate court properly relied on Ralph’s will as evidence of his intent, notwithstanding section 5302(e), which provided that a right of survivorship “cannot be changed by will. ... The court may still look to the will as an expression of intent to negate survivorship." Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal reversed on two issues: (1) the funds in the bank account belonged to Ralph’s estate, which had not been subject to a probate proceeding - the probate court erred in awarding those funds directly to the trust in the absence of a proceeding; and (2) in light of that reversal, the matter was remanded for a reassessment of Stephanie’s attorney fees. View "Placencia v. Strazicich" on Justia Law