Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Kiefer Production Company (KPC), a non-party, appealed adverse discovery orders related to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Keetons, co-trustees and co-personal representatives of Noma Rongey's estate. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) dismissed the appeal, stating the orders were not appealable. KPC then petitioned for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The district court had previously denied the Owners' motion to quash the subpoena and ordered KPC to produce financial documents to determine the value of Rongey's interest in KPC. The district court also placed Rongey's interest in pay status. COCA partially affirmed the district court's order but remanded the case to address the implications of Rongey's death and the scope of the documents requested. On remand, the district court denied KPC's renewed motion to quash and granted the Keetons' motion to compel the production of documents.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the discovery orders were appealable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering KPC to produce the documents. The court found that KPC, as a non-party, had a substantial right affected by the orders and that the orders conclusively determined the issue of document production. The court also held that KPC's financial documents, including tax returns, were relevant to determining the value of Rongey's interest in KPC and were therefore discoverable.The Supreme Court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, requiring KPC to comply with the subpoena. The court also held that KPC did not have standing to appeal the order placing Rongey's interest in pay status, as this issue was not final and was subject to further proceedings. View "ROYAL HOT SHOT INVESTMENTS v. KIEFER PRODUCTION CO." on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

A man domiciled in Washington passed away, leaving a will that specified it should be administered according to Alaska law. He had married his surviving spouse after executing the will. The will devised property to the surviving spouse, his brother, and the National Kidney Foundation (NKF). The surviving spouse claimed statutory allowances and an elective share under Alaska law, arguing she was entitled to the entire estate as an after-married spouse.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, initially ruled that Washington law governed the surviving spouse's rights because the decedent was domiciled in Washington at the time of his death. The court held that Washington law, not Alaska law, determined the surviving spouse's entitlement as an after-married spouse. The court also awarded the surviving spouse a statutory spousal allowance under Washington law but denied her claim to inherit as an after-married spouse. The court granted attorney's fees to NKF and denied the surviving spouse's motion for fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that Alaska law should govern the interpretation and effect of the will, including the rights of an after-married spouse, because the testator had explicitly chosen Alaska law to administer his will. The court found that Alaska's after-married spouse statute pertains to the interpretation and effect of a will when the testator subsequently marries, and thus, Alaska law should apply. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision to apply Washington law and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also vacated the Superior Court's attorney's fee award. View "In the Matter of the Estate of: Bentley" on Justia Law

Trudy Maxwell, a 93-year-old resident of Atria Park of San Mateo, died after ingesting an industrial strength cleaner mistakenly served to her by an Atria employee. Trudy’s eight surviving children, including James Maxwell III (James III), filed a lawsuit against Atria Management Company and related entities, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and elder abuse. The trial court denied Atria’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that James III, who signed the arbitration agreement, was not authorized to do so under his durable power of attorney (DPOA) because he was not authorized to make health care decisions for Trudy. Instead, Trudy’s daughter, Marybeth, held the power of attorney for health care.The Atria defendants appealed, arguing that James III had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement and that all of Trudy’s heirs were bound to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. They also contended that California’s Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), which allows an exception to arbitration when third-party claims may be affected, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s order denying arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court instructed the trial court to reconsider the validity of the arbitration agreement in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC, which held that agreeing to an optional arbitration agreement is not a health care decision. The appellate court also directed the trial court to determine whether the DPOA was valid and whether James III had the authority to agree to arbitration despite Marybeth holding the health care POA. Additionally, the court noted that the wrongful death claims of Trudy’s children were not subject to arbitration as they were not parties to the arbitration agreement. View "Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Occidental Petroleum Corporation acquired Anadarko Petroleum Corporation in 2019, resulting in a trust holding a significant amount of Occidental stock. Wells Fargo, acting as trustee, agreed via email to sell the stock between January 6 and January 10, 2020. However, Wells Fargo failed to execute the sale until March 2020, by which time the stock's value had significantly decreased, causing a loss of over $30 million. Occidental sued Wells Fargo for breach of contract based on the email chain and the Trust Agreement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Occidental, finding that Wells Fargo breached the Trust Agreement by failing to sell the stock as planned. The court also dismissed Wells Fargo’s counterclaim and affirmative defenses and awarded damages and attorney’s fees to Occidental.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the 2019 email chain did not constitute a contract due to lack of consideration. However, Wells Fargo was judicially estopped from arguing that the Trust Agreement was not a contract, as it had previously asserted that the relationship was contractual to dismiss Occidental’s fiduciary-duty claim. The court affirmed that Wells Fargo breached the Trust Agreement by failing to prudently manage the Trust’s assets.The Fifth Circuit also upheld the district court’s calculation of damages, rejecting Wells Fargo’s argument that reinvestment should have been considered. The court found that reinvestment was speculative and unsupported by the record. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of Wells Fargo’s counterclaim and affirmative defenses, as Wells Fargo failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact. Finally, the court upheld the award of attorney’s fees, finding no basis for segregating fees based on Wells Fargo’s different capacities. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Occidental Petroleum v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Melissa Evans was involved in a fatal car accident with Darrell D. Blaylock, resulting in the deaths of both Evans and George D. Blaylock, a passenger in Blaylock's car. Joshua Evans, Melissa's son, initiated probate proceedings and was named the personal representative of her estate. Joshua later sought a court order to declare Melissa's house as qualifying for the homestead exemption. The probate court denied this request, leading Joshua to file an interlocutory appeal.The District Court of Rogers County admitted Melissa's will to probate, named Joshua as the personal representative, and identified the heirs. Deborah Matlock, representing George Blaylock's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Melissa's estate and a creditor demand for inventory. Joshua's motion to declare the house as a homestead was denied after he failed to appear at the hearing. The probate court ruled that the property did not qualify for the homestead exemption as Melissa left no surviving spouse or minor children.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the property did not qualify for either a constitutional or probate homestead exemption. The court clarified that the homestead exemption under Oklahoma law is limited to a surviving spouse and minor children, and does not extend to adult children or grandchildren. Consequently, Joshua Evans and his children were not entitled to the homestead exemption, and the property was available to satisfy the debts of Melissa Evans' estate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EVANS" on Justia Law

Bonny Babin Maloney passed away in May 2020, leaving behind a will that included a no-contest clause. Her husband, Robert Maloney, Sr., had predeceased her in June 2019, and his will also contained a no-contest clause. Upon Robert Sr.'s death, Mrs. Maloney inherited various assets, including the family home. Mrs. Maloney's will bequeathed the family home to her daughter Julie and included a clause disinheriting any heir who contested the will or engaged in a controversy against the executor concerning her estate.Robert Jr. and Kurt, two of Mrs. Maloney's children, filed a petition in Robert Sr.'s succession to annul the codicils of his will, claiming lack of testamentary capacity. They obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Craig, the executor of both estates, from administering the assets, including the family home. The trial court ruled that Robert Sr. had testamentary capacity and disinherited Robert Jr. and Kurt under the no-contest clause in Robert Sr.'s will. Craig then sought to enforce the no-contest clause in Mrs. Maloney's will, arguing that the TRO violated the clause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the no-contest clause in Mrs. Maloney's will was enforceable. The court held that the clause was clear and unambiguous, and Robert Jr. and Kurt's actions in obtaining the TRO against Craig, in his capacity as executor of Mrs. Maloney's estate, triggered the clause. Consequently, Robert Jr. and Kurt were disinherited from Mrs. Maloney's estate. The court affirmed the lower court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Craig, upholding the enforcement of the no-contest clause. View "SUCCESSION OF MALONEY" on Justia Law

Linda Ager Coyle, the personal representative of Fred Ager's estate, filed a motion for confirmation of a specific devise related to the proceeds from the sale of storage units Fred had owned. Fred's will directed that the units be given in equal shares to his children, Linda and Jeff, with a life estate interest in half of the net rental income to his wife, Arlene Ager. Arlene filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate, which the circuit court granted. Subsequently, the court denied Linda's motion for confirmation of the specific devise.Linda appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion, and Arlene filed a notice of review seeking to challenge the court's earlier decision denying her motion to remove Linda as the personal representative. The Supreme Court of South Dakota issued an order to show cause, directing the parties to address whether the order denying the motion to confirm a specific devise was appealable. Linda argued that the order was appealable based on the precedent set in In re Estate of Geier, which held that each proceeding in an unsupervised administration is a final order. Arlene contended that the order was not final and not subject to review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a decision made prior to a final order terminating a supervised probate action is not governed by the Geier final order rule. The court emphasized that supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding under SDCL 29A-3-501, which contrasts with the multiple, independent proceedings allowed under SDCL 29A-3-107 for unsupervised administration. Since the order for supervised administration was signed before the denial of Linda's motion, the action had become a supervised administration, and the individual-proceeding rule of finality did not apply. Consequently, the court also dismissed Arlene's notice of review. View "Estate Of Ager" on Justia Law

Beneficiaries of a family trust sued the co-trustees, alleging mismanagement and the creation of a secret trust to withhold funds. They sought a declaratory judgment, accountings, and damages. The district court excluded all evidence of damages due to the beneficiaries' failure to provide a damages calculation as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the co-trustees, as the beneficiaries could not prove damages and were not entitled to a declaratory judgment or accountings.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana initially handled the case. The court granted the co-trustees' motion in limine to exclude damages evidence and subsequently granted summary judgment on all claims. The court found that the beneficiaries failed to provide a timely damages calculation and that their claims were time-barred under Louisiana law. The beneficiaries appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the damages evidence. The appellate court applied the "CQ factors" to determine that the exclusion was justified due to the importance of the evidence, the prejudice to the co-trustees, the availability of a continuance, and the beneficiaries' lack of a valid explanation for their delay. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment on all claims, as the beneficiaries could not prove an essential element of their case without the excluded damages evidence. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the beneficiaries' request for a declaratory judgment, as it was remedial in nature and dependent on the underlying claims for recovery. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

Jeffrey G. Grossman and his family sued attorney John Peter Wakeman, Jr. and Wakeman Law Group, Inc. for legal malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that Wakeman negligently prepared estate planning documents for Dr. A. Richard Grossman, which disinherited them in favor of Richard's fourth wife, Elizabeth Grossman. Richard's estate was valued at $18 million, and the plaintiffs argued they were the intended beneficiaries. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $9.5 million in damages.The Ventura County Superior Court denied Wakeman's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Wakeman appealed, arguing that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, as they were not his clients. He contended that his duty was solely to Richard, who had instructed him to leave everything to Elizabeth.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that Wakeman owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that there was no clear, certain, and undisputed evidence of Richard's intent to benefit the plaintiffs. Testimonies from Elizabeth and others supported Wakeman's claim that Richard intended to leave his estate to Elizabeth. The court held that imposing a duty on Wakeman to the plaintiffs would place an intolerable burden on the legal profession.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Wakeman and his law group. The appeal from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was dismissed as moot. View "Grossman v. Wakeman" on Justia Law