Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of real property following the death of Billy Skidmore. Billy died intestate in July 2015, leaving behind two sons, John and Billy Jr. The Marshall Probate Court awarded John letters of administration over Billy's estate. Billy Jr. later filed a claim asserting his entitlement to an equal share of the estate. John filed an inventory listing the estate's assets, including a one-third interest in a commercial building. Billy Jr. moved to compel a final settlement, leading to a hearing where John admitted to commingling estate rental proceeds with his personal funds. The probate court subsequently appointed Billy Jr. as the successor administrator and authorized him to list the estate's real property for sale.John discovered a 2004 deed conveying the property to him and Billy as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, which he recorded in July 2023. Despite this, the probate court declared the property to be owned one-third each by John, Jenna (John's ex-wife), and Billy's estate. John removed the administration of the estate to the Marshall Circuit Court and filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the probate court's judgment. The circuit court denied his motion, leading John to appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Marshall Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute over the title to the real property. The court emphasized that probate courts do not have the authority to determine equitable issues or administer equitable remedies, such as setting aside a recorded deed. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Skidmore v. Skidmore" on Justia Law

Thomas Labs, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, sued Amber Marie Dukes and her veterinary supply company for money owed on products delivered. During the litigation, Dukes died, and her counsel filed a notice of death but did not serve any nonparty successors or representatives. Thomas Labs moved to substitute Dukes' trust and trustee, Jason Hilliard, as parties, which the district court granted. Later, Dukes' will was filed in probate court, appointing her brother, Lynn Hill, as personal representative. Dukes' counsel then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither Hilliard nor the trust were proper representatives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against Dukes, concluding that the 180-day deadline for substitution under NRCP 25(a) had passed. The court found that service of the notice of death on the parties alone triggered the deadline, even though no court-appointed executor or administrator existed when the notice was filed. The district court also denied Thomas Labs' motion to substitute a special administrator, Shara Berry, as untimely.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified that under NRCP 25(a), when a decedent's attorney files a notice of death, they must serve the notice on nonparty successors or representatives to start the 180-day deadline for substitution. The court also noted that NRS 7.075 requires the decedent's attorney to file a motion to substitute a proper party within 90 days of the client's death. The Supreme Court found that the 180-day deadline never started because Dukes' counsel failed to serve the nonparty successors or representatives. Consequently, the district court's dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the substitution of a special administrator for Dukes. View "THOMAS LABS, LLC VS. DUKES" on Justia Law

Jerry Simon, the decedent, owned a ranching operation known as Simon Ranch, Inc. He had a will that left all his property to his only child, DeLynn Hanson. Jerry married Lynda Simon in 2011, after executing his will. Lynda filed a petition as an omitted spouse seeking an intestate share of Jerry’s estate under SDCL 29A-2-301, arguing she was entitled to a share because she was not provided for in the will.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, denied Lynda’s petition. The court found that Jerry had provided for Lynda outside of the will with the intent that these transfers were in lieu of any testamentary provision. The court based its decision on evidence that Jerry had transferred assets, including horses and vehicles, into joint ownership with Lynda and had made statements indicating his intent to leave Simon Ranch to his daughter and grandchildren. The court granted Lynda an elective share of 21% of Jerry’s augmented estate under SDCL 29A-2-202.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Jerry intended to provide for Lynda outside of his will. The Supreme Court noted that Jerry’s statements, the amount of the transfers, and other evidence supported the conclusion that Jerry intended to omit Lynda from his will and provide for her through other means. The court upheld the denial of Lynda’s petition for an intestate share and affirmed the grant of an elective share. View "In the Matter of the Estate Of Simon" on Justia Law

Carla Montgomery petitioned to receive a share of her deceased father Benjamin C. Williams' trust estate, claiming she was an omitted child under Probate Code section 21622. Carla was born following a brief relationship between her mother, Annie Elliott, and Benjamin in the 1960s. Benjamin, who fathered seven children in total, moved to California shortly after Carla's conception and was unaware of her birth. In 1999, Benjamin executed a trust naming only his two youngest children, Benita Ligia Williams and Benjamin S. Williams, as beneficiaries. Carla learned of Benjamin's death and the trust's existence in 2019 and subsequently petitioned for a share of the estate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a one-day trial where evidence and testimonies were presented. The court found that Benjamin was unaware of Carla's birth when he executed the trust but concluded that Carla failed to prove that her omission was solely due to Benjamin's unawareness of her existence. The court noted that Benjamin had also omitted four other known children from his trust, indicating his intent to provide only for the two named beneficiaries. Consequently, the court denied Carla's petition and entered judgment against her.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the trial court's application of the reasoning from Rallo v. O’Brian, which requires an omitted child to prove that the sole reason for their omission was the testator's unawareness of their birth. The appellate court found that Benjamin's omission of his other known children demonstrated his intent to exclude all preexisting children, known or unknown. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, denying Carla's petition and awarding costs on appeal to Benita. View "Estate of Williams" on Justia Law

John O’Hara pleaded guilty to wire fraud and bank fraud for misappropriating funds from his mother, Sally Thrush. Thrush passed away shortly after his plea, leaving O’Hara as the sole beneficiary of her estate. At sentencing, the district court ordered O’Hara to pay over $300,000 in restitution to Thrush’s estate, despite knowing that O’Hara would likely receive the restitution as the estate’s beneficiary. Four years later, the district court amended the judgment to direct O’Hara to pay the federal Crime Victims Fund instead of the estate.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially sentenced O’Hara to twenty-six months in prison and ordered him to pay restitution to his mother’s estate. After O’Hara’s release from prison, the district court, prompted by the government, amended the judgment to substitute the Crime Victims Fund as the payee, reasoning that allowing O’Hara to receive his own restitution would be contrary to the intent of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court did not have the authority to modify the final judgment to substitute a new payee. The appellate court held that the MVRA, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), does not provide the statutory authority to amend a restitution order post-judgment. The court emphasized that a final restitution order can only be modified under specific statutory provisions, none of which applied in this case. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case. View "United States v. O'Hara" on Justia Law

Joel M. Guy, Jr. murdered his parents in 2016 with the intent to collect the proceeds from his mother’s insurance plans. His mother had life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance through her employer, naming Guy and his father as beneficiaries. Guy was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and abuse of a corpse by a Tennessee jury.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee determined that Guy would be entitled to the insurance proceeds if not disqualified. However, the court ruled that Guy was disqualified under Tennessee’s slayer statute or federal common law, which prevents a murderer from benefiting from their crime. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Guy’s family members, who argued that Guy was not entitled to the benefits. Guy appealed, arguing that ERISA preempts Tennessee’s slayer statute and that no federal common-law slayer rule applies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that ERISA does not explicitly address the issue of a beneficiary who murders the insured, and thus, either Tennessee law or federal common law must apply. The court found that both Tennessee’s slayer statute and federal common law would disqualify Guy from receiving the insurance proceeds. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Guy’s actions disqualified him from benefiting from his mother’s insurance plans under both state and federal law. View "Standard Insurance Co. v. Guy" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

Pauline Bennett, the settlor of a revocable living trust, engaged attorney Thomas Gentile to draft her estate planning documents. Initially, the trust instrument provided for the distribution of her properties, including a specific property, Wissahican, to her daughter Audrey upon her death. Later, due to concerns about Audrey's financial mismanagement, Pauline amended the trust to remove Audrey as a beneficiary and intended to sell Wissahican to fund her care. After Pauline's death, a dispute arose between her daughters, Madelyn and Audrey, over the ownership of Wissahican.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled that the 2017 trust instrument, which provided Wissahican to Audrey, was still in effect, and thus Audrey was entitled to the property. Madelyn, as the successor trustee, then pursued claims against Gentile for legal malpractice, alleging that his negligent drafting of the 2019 trust instrument caused her to lose Wissahican. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gentile, holding that the strict privity rule barred Madelyn's claims and that she was not a third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship between Pauline and Gentile.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the strict privity rule, as established in Noble v. Bruce, remains good law, meaning that a third party not in privity with an attorney cannot sue for negligence absent fraud or collusion. The court also concluded that Madelyn did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary because the primary intent of Pauline's engagement with Gentile was to ensure her own financial security and to exclude Audrey, not to benefit Madelyn directly. Therefore, Madelyn's claims against Gentile were barred, and the summary judgment in favor of Gentile was affirmed. View "Bennett v. Gentile" on Justia Law

Alonzo Union served as the caretaker and power of attorney for Jean Miller, an elderly woman with dementia. Union had access to Miller's finances and was responsible for her care. After Miller moved into a nursing home and accumulated an unpaid bill, the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF) investigated Union's financial activities. Union entered a no contest plea to mistreatment of a dependent adult. The court ordered Union to pay restitution to the nursing home for Miller's outstanding balance and to Miller for certain payments and cash withdrawals from her account.The Wyandotte District Court accepted Union's no contest plea and found him guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a 43-month underlying sentence, suspended in favor of probation, and ordered Union to pay $31,511.26 in restitution. This amount included $7,632.74 to the nursing home and $23,878.52 to Miller, covering one-half of the ATM withdrawals and Walmart purchases, among other expenses. Union appealed, arguing that the restitution order was not supported by substantial competent evidence. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's restitution order, except for the part that converted the restitution award into a civil judgment.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the portion of the restitution order directing Union to pay the nursing home $7,632.74, finding insufficient evidence that Union's crime caused the unpaid bill. However, the court affirmed the restitution order requiring Union to pay $23,878.52 to Miller. The court concluded that Union's no contest plea established that he misappropriated at least $25,000 from Miller, providing substantial competent evidence to support the restitution amount. The court held that the no contest plea and the well-pleaded facts in the charging document could be considered in determining the restitution award. View "State v. Union" on Justia Law

The Connary heirs appealed a summary judgment favoring the Shea brothers regarding the reformation of the Shea Family Living Trust. The Trust, established by William and Patricia Shea, included a provision to distribute bank stock to the Connary heirs. However, the bank recalled and redeemed the stock, and the Trust received approximately $460,000. After Patricia's death, the successor trustee determined the stock was no longer part of the Trust and refused to distribute money in lieu of the stock to the Connary heirs.Initially, the Superior Court (Stewart, J.) ruled that the Trust's legacy of the bank stock was a specific devise that had adeemed, meaning the stock was no longer part of the Trust. The court dismissed Connary's reformation claim without specific litigation on that issue. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the interpretation of the Trust but remanded the case for further proceedings on the reformation claim.On remand, the Superior Court (O’Neil, J.) granted summary judgment to the Shea brothers, concluding that Connary had not provided admissible evidence to generate a genuine dispute of fact regarding the reformation claim. Connary argued that Patricia's statements to family members about her intent should be considered, but the court ruled this evidence inadmissible.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that even if Patricia's statements were admissible, Connary's reformation claim could not survive summary judgment. The court held that reformation is only available to conform to both settlors' intentions if affected by a mistake. There was no evidence of William's intent or mistake regarding the bank stock. Additionally, reformation cannot be used to address changes in circumstances that occurred after the Trust's execution. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "Connary v. Shea" on Justia Law