Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In this dispute surrounding the distribution of the assets of the parties' deceased mother the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the superior court with respect to the substance of two orders of the probate court, holding that two bank accounts should be distributed pursuant to paragraph three of the decedent's will and that there was no basis to remove the current executrix of the decedent's estate.The decedent's children were Michaela, Mark, Lizbeth, and Lisa. Lizbeth was named executrix of the decedent's estate. The probate court determined that the two accounts at issue were part of the "general inventory" of the estate and, therefore, the proceeds of those accounts should be distributed under paragraph six of Catherine's will - i.e., divided equally among all four of Catherine's children. Lizbeth appealed. When Michaela and Mark unsuccessfully sought to remove Lizabeth as executrix, they appealed. The two appeals were consolidated. The superior court concluded that the accounts were not estate assets and, pursuant to paragraph three of the decedent's will, should be distributed to Lisa and Lizbeth respectively. The court affirmed the probate court's decision not to remove Lizabeth as executrix. The Supreme Court affirmed both judgments of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in its judgment. View "Larkin v. Arthurs" on Justia Law

The Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Melbourne (Australia) appealed a circuit court order denying it standing to request affirmative relief and enforce certain charitable trusts created by the will of Mary Baker Eddy. Mary Baker Eddy founded the Church of Christian Science and, upon her death in 1910, her will established two testamentary trusts, known as the Clause VI Trust and Clause VIII Trust. In previous litigation concerning these trusts, we upheld the validity of the trusts and established that the bequest in Clause VIII was to be held in trust for two purposes, church building repair and “promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by [Mrs. Eddy].” The underlying litigation commenced in 2015, when Second Church, an alleged qualified beneficiary of the Clause VIII Trust, sought to review, and potentially object to, the annual accounting filed by the trustees. In March 2018, the trial court issued an order finding that Second Church failed to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that it had standing. The trial court acknowledged the general rule that when a trust is determined to be charitable, it becomes the duty of the attorney general to ensure that the rights of the public in the trust are protected and that the trust is properly executed. The court further noted that New Hampshire law was unclear as to whether a possible beneficiary of a charitable trust, like Second Church here, had standing. Looking to other jurisdictions for guidance, the trial court determined that most jurisdictions have ruled that a possible beneficiary is generally not entitled to sue for enforcement of the trust. After considering how other courts have applied the doctrine of special interest standing, the trial court applied a five-factor test, often referred to as the Blasko test. The trial court found that none of the factors weighed in favor of granting Second Church standing. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed Second Church lacked standing. View "In re Trust of Mary Baker Eddy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court finding attorney Jonathan Streit in contempt of court and assessing a $100 fine, holding that substantial evidence supported the court's decision that Streit's actions displayed a lack of regard for the court's integrity and demonstrated disrespect.Streit appeared before the circuit court on a petition for permanent guardianship. At the hearing, the circuit court noted several deficiencies in the case file. The circuit court was unwilling to let the matter to proceed without compliance with the statutory requirements, and Streit argued that the circuit court took issue with him because he successfully reversed the circuit court in a separate case. The circuit court then found Streit in contempt of court and assessed a fine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the court's decision to hold Streit in contempt. View "Streit v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Appellant's probate appeal after finding that, because Appellant was under guardianship, he lacked the capacity to retain legal counsel and file an appeal to the superior court in his own name, holding that the superior court properly dismissed Appellant's appeal on the ground that Appellant lacked the capacity to bring and maintain an action in his own name.On appeal, Appellant argued that the superior court erred in dismissing his probate appeal because he was only under a limited guardianship and was thus entitled to pursue the probate appeal on his own. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not under a limited guardianship, but, rather, a full guardianship, and did not retain the right to pursue this action on his own behalf. View "In re Estate of Amet Chelo" on Justia Law

Edith Rogers appealed her removal as administrator of the estate of her grandfather Roscoe Sapp, Sr. (decedent), who died in 1994. Armuress Sapp and Brian Lincoln, two of decedent’s grandsons, separately petitioned to remove Rogers as administrator. The probate court found Rogers: (1) had failed to comply with the court’s 2001 instructions that she and her coadministrator (who died in 2003) sell the estate’s remaining real estate holdings and distribute the net proceeds to the beneficiaries of the decedent’s will; and (2) acted in bad faith toward the beneficiaries by trying to buy them out for much less than they would have received if she had timely sold the properties. The court therefore concluded Rogers had to be removed because she “mismanaged” the estate and was “incapable of properly executing the duties of the office” of administrator. The probate court withdrew letters of administration issued to Rogers and appointed Armuress as special administrator. In her briefs, Rogers challenged: (1) the 2001 order instructing the coadministrators to sell the estate’s real property; (2) the probate court’s 2016 denial of her petition for additional instructions; and (3) the 2017 judgment removing her as personal representative. The Court of Appeal determined the 2017 judgment was properly before it. Although the Court concluded the evidence did not support a finding that Rogers was incapable of executing the duties of administrator, the evidence supported her removal because she was not otherwise qualified to act as administrator, and she mismanaged the estate. Because the Court concluded Rogers did not demonstrate the probate court abused its discretion when it removed her, judgment was affirmed View "Estate of Sapp" on Justia Law

Believing that she would be inheriting half of her father’s estate, Deann Turcott and her husband spent considerable time and money making improvements on the father’s land. However, the father subsequently changed his will and left Deann nothing. Deann filed suit seeking quantum meruit damages for the work she had performed. The district court held that quantum meruit damages were not appropriate and awarded damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. Deann appealed the district court’s award of unjust enrichment damages as inadequate. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Turcott v. Estate of Clarence D. Bates" on Justia Law

Believing that she would be inheriting half of her father’s estate, Deann Turcott and her husband spent considerable time and money making improvements on the father’s land. However, the father subsequently changed his will and left Deann nothing. Deann filed suit seeking quantum meruit damages for the work she had performed. The district court held that quantum meruit damages were not appropriate and awarded damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. Deann appealed the district court’s award of unjust enrichment damages as inadequate. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Turcott v. Estate of Clarence D. Bates" on Justia Law

The Chancery Court set aside an interviews gift of about forty acres of land fronting Highway 6 near Oxford, Mississippi. Ninety-year-old grantor Mary Saunders Waller, hard of hearing and legally blind, allegedly granted the land to Waller’s daughter and son-in-law, Brenda and Craig Gordon. A conservator for Waller’s estate petitioned the probate court to set aside the deed to the Gordons. The chancellor found the Gordons were unable to rebut the presumption of undue influence. On appeal, the Gordons contended the Chancery Court erred in excluding certain testimony of Waller’s attorney and her physicians. The Mississippi Supreme Court found, however, the Gordons failed to make an offer of proof: since the Supreme Court would have no way of knowing what the physicians would have said had they testified, the Court could not conclude excluding their testimony was an error. The Court determined the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion denying the Gordons’ motion for a new trial “based on arguments that could have, and should have, been raised at trial.” View "In The Matter of The Last Will & Testament of Mary Saunders Waller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion to reconsider its initial appointment of the decedent's father as special administrator for the decedent's estate, holding that, though not required by statute or trial rule, courts should give notice and hold a hearing before appointing a special administrator or rescinding such an appointment.After Orlando Lewis, Jr. (Junior) died in a car crash, Orlando Lewis Sr. (Senior) was appointed special administrator to Junior's estate. Shana Toliver sought to remove Senior as special administrator of Junior's estate. Kathy Calloway also asked the trial court either to reconsider its appointment of Senior as special administrator or to remove him. The court ordered that it would reconsider and rescind its prior appointment of Senior as special administrator and appoint Toliver and Calloway as co-special administrators for Junior's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court could reconsider its prior appointment of Senior because the underlying matter was still pending; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its appointment of Senior; and (3) an appointing or rescinding court should notify interested parties and hold a hearing. View "Lewis v. Toliver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying Appellant's motion to dissolve an ex parte attachment entered by the superior court, holding that the court applied an incorrect standard of proof in its order on the motion to dissolve.The Portland Museum of Art (PMA) filed a complaint against Appellant alleging tortious interference with expected inheritance and undue influence and requesting an accounting. The PMA then filed an ex parte motion for attachment and trustee process, which the superior court granted. Thereafter, Appellant unsuccessfully filed a motion to dissolve the attachment and trustee process. The court denied the motion to dissolve, ruling that there was a reasonable likelihood that PMA would recover judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the motion to dissolve attachment, holding (1) the court unambiguously articulated the incorrect standard of proof in its order on the motion to dissolve; and (2) the misstatement of the standard was not harmless. View "Portland Museum of Art v. Germain" on Justia Law